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As several scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s Gonzales v. Carhart decision upholding the
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA) represents a major departure from its
previous abortion jurisprudence. What has received little attention is the ease with which
Carhart’s rationale can be imported into cases involving the medical treatment of women who wish
to continue their pregnancies to term. This article analyzes the implications of Carhart in a
context that has thus far been overlooked and, in doing so, argues that its reasoning is broader
and more troubling than the majority acknowledged or perhaps even intended.
While common and constitutional law protect the right to refuse medical treatment, courts have
compelled the medical treatment of pregnant women on rare occasions, citing the states’ interest in
protecting fetal life as recognized in abortion jurisprudence. Until Carhart, abortion
jurisprudence provided very limited support for compelled medical treatment of pregnant women
more generally. Carhart interprets the state interests in fetal life and maternal health so broadly
that it essentially creates new, dubious state interests that, in the context of compelled treatment
cases, expand state justifications for requiring medical treatment of pregnant women, even where
such treatment would harm women’s health. The expansion of state power to compel medical
treatment has disturbing implications for women’s liberty and equality. Carhart paves the way to
designating women as a “special class of persons” who have more limited rights to bodily autonomy
and informed consent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the majority’s protestations to the contrary, the Supreme
1
Court’s Gonzales v. Carhart decision represents a significant departure
from its previous abortion jurisprudence. In Carhart, the Supreme
Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
2
(PBABA), which outlawed a procedure used during abortions. As
the dissent notes, the majority’s argument uses new, dubious inter3
pretations of state interests to justify abortion regulation. The Court
also upheld PBABA despite significant medical evidence that the
banned procedure is necessary to preserve women’s health in many
circumstances, undermining the principle under Roe v. Wade and its
progeny that women’s health must always be paramount in abortion
4
regulation.
Although numerous scholars have noted Carhart’s troubling im5
plications for expanding states’ ability to regulate abortion, there has
1
2
3

4
5

550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 132, 168.
See id. at 181–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court offers flimsy and
transparent justifications for upholding a nationwide ban on intact [intact dilation and
evacuation procedure] sans any exception to safeguard a women’s health”).
See id. at 161–68 (discussing medical evidence pertaining to the necessity of the banned
procedure and concluding that the Act should be upheld despite this evidence).
See, e.g., Leading Cases, Abortion Rights—“Partial Birth” Abortion, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 265
(2007) [hereinafter Leading Cases, Abortion Rights] (arguing that Carhart’s deference to
Congress in the face of medical disagreement was “inadequately theorized and swept too
broadly”); Michael C. Dorf, Abortion Rights, 23 TOURO. L. REV. 815, 822–24 (2008) (criticizing Carhart’s reasoning as expanding accepted state justifications for restricting abortion); Matthew Gordon, State Attempts to Expand Abortion Informed Consent Requirements:
New Life After Gonzales v. Carhart?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 751, 751, 753 (2007) (arguing
that Carhart may provide new support to other restrictions on abortion access); Reva B.
Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1650 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Right’s Reasons] (arguing that Carhart’s woman-protective rationale for restricting abortion advances an antiabortion argument that is gender-paternalistic and unresponsive to the real needs of
women); Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 251, 274–75 (2007) (arguing that Carhart elevated the status of the fetus and diminished the status of a woman by banning an abortion procedure without creating an exception for medical necessity); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2008) (arguing that Carhart’s
reasoning can be expanded to restrict other abortion procedures).
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been little discussion of the ease with which Carhart’s rationale can be
imported into cases involving the medical treatment of women who
wish to continue their pregnancies to term. This article argues that,
while Carhart is objectionable solely based on the abortion issue it
squarely addresses, further analysis reveals that its reasoning has
troubling implications for women’s right to control other medical
decisions during pregnancy. Lower courts have considered attempts
to compel treatment of pregnant women who intend to carry their
pregnancies to term, but who have rejected medical intervention that
would, in their physicians’ opinion, be optimal or even necessary to
preserve the life or health of the fetus. Courts have looked to abortion jurisprudence to determine the parameters of the state’s interest
in fetal life and whether that interest can justify intervention in pregnant women’s medical decisions that place the fetus they carry at risk.
Until Carhart, abortion jurisprudence provided very limited support
for such intervention.
This article analyzes implications of Carhart that have thus far
been overlooked and argues that its reasoning is broader and more
troubling than the majority acknowledged or perhaps even intended.
While on its face Carhart is limited to abortion procedures, it relies
heavily on reasoning that is easily expanded to the compelled treatment of pregnant women. Carhart reinterprets the state interests in
fetal life and maternal health and recognizes new interests that justify
abortion regulation: expressing respect for fetal life and preventing a
woman from exercising informed consent where her decision would
harm the fetus and might subsequently cause her to feel remorse.
The decision also undermines the principle that these state interests
may not be pursued at the expense of maternal health. In the context of compelled treatment cases, this reasoning allows the state to
compel medical treatment of pregnant women in order to further the
dubious interpretations of state interests in showing respect for the
fetus and protecting the woman from making medical decisions the
state believes she might regret and may even justify compelling such
treatment where it would harm the woman’s health.
Part II of this article outlines the Carhart decision and argues that
Carhart’s reasoning expands the state interests that may be used to
regulate abortion. Carhart also eroded the primacy of women’s
health, implying that these interests may be pursued at the expense
of women’s health in certain circumstances. Part III examines the jurisprudence of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.
While common law and constitutional jurisprudence recognize the
right to refuse medical treatment, courts have often viewed pregnancy as a unique circumstance subject to additional state interference.
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In doing so, they looked to abortion jurisprudence to allow limited
state intervention in pregnant women’s medical treatment choices to
further the state’s interest in fetal life. Part III argues that, until Carhart, abortion jurisprudence provided only very limited support for
compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.
Part IV argues that a reasonable interpretation of Carhart’s reasoning expands state power to compel medical treatment of pregnant
women who intend to carry their pregnancies to term. While Carhart
6
and its predecessor, Stenberg v. Carhart, concerned abortion rights,
the crux of the issue in both cases was balancing a patient’s right to
choose her course of medical treatment against the state’s interest in
fetal life. Carhart recognizes new state interests and allows the state to
pursue them at the expense of women’s health where there is a modicum of uncertainty about the effect on women’s health. It provides
new arguments for those seeking to compel the medical treatment of
pregnant women for the benefit of the fetus, even where such treatment might be detrimental to the health of the woman. Part IV also
demonstrates how this reasoning could be applied to specific medical
decisions that arise during pregnancy and childbirth.
Part V argues that the expansion of state intervention into the
medical treatment decisions of pregnant women has several disturbing consequences. Doctrinally, it infringes on women’s liberty and
equality rights, designating pregnant women as a “special class of per7
sons” who, solely because of their pregnancy, have more limited
rights to bodily autonomy and informed consent. It perpetuates the
view that pregnant women are less autonomous than other individuals and that the state may commandeer their bodies because of their
reproductive capabilities. Because Supreme Court jurisprudence has
separated and weakened liberty-based and equality-based arguments
that challenge limitations on women’s reproductive rights, it often
fails to recognize the full implications of compelled medical treatment. Part V presents an approach that views these two interests as
intertwined, which more accurately addresses the ramifications of
compelled medical treatment and provides fuller protection for
pregnant women’s rights to refuse medical treatment. Part V also argues that compelled medical treatment has troubling public health
implications, damaging the physician-patient relationship, placing
physicians in the ethically questionable position of seeking court in-

6
7

530 U.S. 914 (2000).
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1256 (D.C. 1990) (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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tervention in more situations, and compromising prenatal medical
care.
II. THE GONZALES V. CARHART DECISION
A. Background
The Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional right to an
8
abortion in Roe v. Wade. In Roe, the Court held that the right to an
abortion is part of the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth
9
Amendment. It acknowledged the health issues of women needing
abortions and held that, while the state has an interest in fetal life
that becomes compelling at viability, this interest may not be pursued
10
at the expense of the health or life of the mother. The state may
prohibit abortion after viability, but it must allow an exception for the
life or health of the mother. The Court’s 1992 decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey held that the state may
regulate abortion prior to viability to further its interest in protecting
women’s health, as long as the regulations do not create an “undue
11
burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion. It reaffirmed
Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling
at viability and that the state may regulate and even proscribe abortion after viability as long as it maintains an exception for the life or
health of the mother. Casey therefore sustained the primacy of the
mother’s life and health over the state’s interest in protecting fetal
12
life.
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska statute
13
outlawing what it termed “partial birth abortions.” The Court cited
8
9

10

11

12
13

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 152–54.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
See id. at 163–64 (“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go
so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.”).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A statute with [a
purpose of creating an undue burden on a woman’s access to an abortion] is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”).
See id. at 846 (restating and reaffirming the holding of Roe v. Wade).
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000) (“We must consequently find the
statute unconstitutional.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 265

Nov. 2010]

SPECIAL CLASS OF PERSONS

151

two grounds for its holding: (1) that the Nebraska law contained no
health exception, and (2) that the law was unconstitutionally vague,
making it impossible for physicians to determine whether several
14
abortion procedures were permissible under the statute. Stenberg v.
Carhart reiterated the health exception requirement set forth in Roe
15
and Casey. It rejected the argument that a health exception is not
required where there are safe alternatives available because Nebraska
failed to demonstrate that the ban would not create significant risks
16
for women. It cited the “significant medical authority” supporting
the proposition that “in some circumstances, [the banned proce17
dure] would be the safest procedure.” Stenberg v. Carhart affirmed
that the mother’s health may not be compromised by abortion regulation, and that this requirement not only prohibits courts from banning post-viability abortion altogether, but also from banning a particular pre-viability or post-viability abortion procedure that is a safer
alternative than another procedure that remains available.
The Court also rejected arguments that the health exception is
not required because of uncertainty as to whether the procedure
would be necessary or affect most women’s health. The Court dis-

14

15
16

17

(noting that “the Supreme Court struck down on facial challenge Nebraska’s ‘partialbirth’ abortion ban for failing to provide an exception allowing the procedure when necessary to protect the health of the mother”); Dorf, supra note 5, at 817–18 (discussing
how the Court found Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban to be unconstitutional because it violated “the principles of Casey”); Turner, supra note 5, at 12 (providing information about the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Nebraska’s “‘partial-birth abortion’ law”); Laura J. Tepich, Note, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right
to Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 365–71 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s rationale for its decision in Stenberg v. Carhart). The term “partial birth abortion” was coined
by a member of Congress while developing legislation banning certain abortion procedures. It is a political, rather than medical, term and is not recognized in the medical
field. See Alex Gordon, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
501, 502 n.15 (2004) [hereinafter Gordon, PBABA].
See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 937–38, 942–43 (elaborating on the two grounds for the Supreme Court’s holding); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 817–18 (discussing the two grounds
for the Supreme Court’s holding); Tepich, supra note 13, at 367–68 (“The Court, after
summarizing the medical procedures involved in the Nebraska statute, proceeded quickly
to conclude that the statute violated the Constitution for at least two independent reasons.”).
See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (noting that the law lacked an exception to preserve the
mother’s health).
See id. at 932 (“The State fails to demonstrate that banning [the dilation and evacuation
procedure] without a health exception may not create significant health risks for women . . . .”); see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the Court’s conclusion that a
substantial number of medical experts believed that the procedure would be safer for
some patients).
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Stenberg v. Carhart).
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missed the argument that the health exception was not necessary because the procedure was rarely employed, arguing, “the State cannot
prohibit a person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing out
18
that most people do not need it.” The determination that a procedure is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother does not require “an absolute necessity,” “absolute proof,” or
19
“unanimity of medical opinion.”
In reaction to the decision, Congress passed the federal Partial20
PBABA is materially
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA).
identical to the Nebraska statute in all respects except that it contains
a different definition of what constitutes a “partial-birth abortion,” a
term used to describe a variation of a procedure the medical com21
munity refers to as a “dilation and evacuation,” or a “D&E.” The statute provides anatomical landmarks intended to give greater notice
to physicians as to whether a procedure is outlawed than the Ne22
braska statute. It contains a life exception but no health exception,
citing congressional findings that a “moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abor23
tion . . . is never medically necessary.” PBABA was successfully challenged in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which both held that

18

19

20
21

22

23

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (“[T]he Court concluded
that the infrequency of the [dilation and evacuation] procedure did not justify Nebraska’s lack of a health exception and that the procedure’s relative rarity was ‘not highly
relevant.’”).
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing how a “significant body of medical opinion” believed that the dilation and evacuation procedure was
safer for some patients and noting that the Carhart Court felt the procedure should not
be banned in light of this belief).
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003); Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 266;
Dorf, supra note 5, at 818–19.
See Press Release, ACOG Files Amicus Brief in Gonzales v. Carhart and Gonzales v. PPFA
(Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr0922-06.cfm; see also Gordon, PBABA, supra note 13, at 502 n.15. The term “partial birth
abortion” is not a medical term and was invented for the purposes of legislation. See id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2003). The act defines a “partial-birth abortion”
to be an abortion in which the individual performing the abortion
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or,
in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother . . . .
See also Dorf, supra note 5, at 818–19 (describing how the federal act provided a clearer definition of a partial-birth abortion than the Nebraska law).
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003); see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at
266 (noting that Congress adopted factual findings in conflict with those relied upon by
the Stenberg v. Carhart court in enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
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PBABA unconstitutionally failed to provide a health exception. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed both decisions in
25
Gonzales v. Carhart.
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, cited numerous state interests supporting PBABA. Primary among these was an
26
interest in expressing respect for human life. The Court, citing the
state interest in protecting fetal life, stated, “[t]he government may
use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect
27
for the life within the woman.” The Court argued that the state
could further this interest by banning a procedure that would “coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
28
and innocent human life . . . .”
The Court also cited a related state interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession by protecting the respect
29
for fetal life within the medical profession. The Court argued that
the state’s “legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession
in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn,”
was served by PBABA because the banned procedure “implicates additional ethical and moral concerns” above and beyond other abor30
tion procedures. It argued that PBABA also furthered this interest
24

25
26

27

28
29

30

See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 792–96 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the PBABA unconstitutional due to its lack of health exception); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the PBABA unconstitutional on the grounds that it “lacks the constitutionally required health exception”). The Ninth Circuit also held that PBABA was unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally restricted the dilation and extraction abortion procedure. See Planned
Parenthood Fed’n, 435 F.3d at 1171.
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See id. at 157 (“The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life.”); see also Turner,
supra note 5, at 15 (citing passages from Gonzales v. Carhart which highlight state interests
supporting PBABA).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at
268 (discussing governmental interests underlying the ban deemed legitimate by the
Court); Tepich supra note 13, at 381 (quoting the highlighted passage); Turner, supra
note 5, at 15 (quoting the highlighted passage).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Stahle, supra note 5, at 274–75 (quoting the
highlighted passage).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (“There can be no doubt that the government
‘has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.’”); see also
Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (quoting passages from Gonzales v. Carhart suggesting that
the public’s perception of a doctor’s appropriate role during the delivery process could
be upset by knowledge that doctors assist in partial-birth abortions).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158; see also Turner, supra note 5, at 15 (quoting the highlighted passage).

154

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:1

because Congress might reasonably conclude that “partial birth abortion, more than standard D&E, ‘undermines the public’s perception
of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process,
31
and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.’”
The Court also described a state interest in protecting a woman
from the regret it presumed she would feel if she chose to undergo
the banned procedure. In the majority’s words:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well.
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
32
depression and loss of esteem can follow.

In support of this theory, the Court cited an amicus brief supporting PBABA that argued that “abortion hurts women physically, emotionally, and psychologically,” and that women who have abortions
33
often suffer from “Post-abortion Syndrome.”
The Court also tied this concern to the need to protect informed
consent among patients:
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors
may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used,
confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure
entails. . . . It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning
the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to
the State. The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well
informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished . . . when she learns,
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her un34
born child, a child assuming the human form.

After finding that PBABA furthers these purported state interests,
the Court turned to the question of whether PBABA is unconstitu31

32
33

34

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 160 (quoting Congressional Findings ¶(14)(K)). But see
Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (suggesting the public’s perception of physicians might actually be improved by allowing doctors to use safe abortion methods).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted); see also Turner, note 5, at
16–18 (discussing the meager evidence available to support the “regret rationale”).
Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, 19, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159
(citing the Sandra Cano et al. amicus brief); Turner, supra note 5, at 16–17 (highlighting
sections of the Sandra Cano et al. amicus brief which suggest that abortion harms women).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–60 (internal citation omitted); see also Turner, supra
note 5, at 17–18 (discussing the women’s regret rationale used to support the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart).
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tional because it lacks a health exception. The Court determined
that PBABA need not contain a health exception because of “documented medical disagreement” over whether the procedure is medi35
cally necessary. While the Court would not give complete deference
to legislative findings—and, indeed, noted inaccuracies in Congress’s
findings—it implied that it would defer to legislative findings where
36
“medical uncertainty” exists.
The Court justified its holding by distinguishing facial attacks
from as-applied challenges and by arguing that medical uncertainty
about the need for a health exception precluded a holding that
37
PBABA was invalid on its face. The respondents had not met the
“heavy burden” of a facial attack because they had not demonstrated
that PBABA “would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant
38
cases.” It further argued that the statute at issue was applicable
whenever “the doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not
merely those in which the woman suffers from medical complications. It is neither our obligation nor within our traditional institutional role to resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to
39
each potential situation that might develop.” The Court concluded
that a facial attack could not succeed because the respondents could
not show that the banned procedure is medically necessary in a large
40
fraction of the cases in which the procedure is used.
The Court left open the question of whether an as-applied challenge could succeed. It argued that an as-applied challenge, rather
than a facial challenge, was the proper means to challenge PBABA “if
it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used” because “[i]n an as-applied challenge

35

36

37

38
39
40

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 162–66; see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at
268 (indicating that despite the “documented medical disagreement” regarding whether
the procedure was ever medically necessary, the Court upheld the PBABA).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164–65; see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at
268 (discussing this section of the Gonzales v. Carhart opinion); Dorf, supra note 5, at 821
(noting that the Court chose to uphold PBABA despite noting that Congress is “not entitled to any special deference”).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there
is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s
health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe
alternatives.”).
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 167–68.
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the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced
41
than in a facial attack.”
C. The Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, criticized the majority opinion for sacrificing women’s health to further dubious state interests. Echoing the
majority opinion in Stenberg, the dissent noted that PBABA did not
further any of the state interests that Roe identified as justifying the
regulation of abortion in limited circumstances. It argued that
PBABA does not further the state interest in fetal life because no fetal
lives were saved; the ban only limits how a fetus will be aborted rather
42
than whether a fetus will be aborted.
The dissent also rejected the “mother’s regret” rationale as a paternalistic intrusion into the rights of women to make their own med43
ical decisions. The dissent noted that there was no evidence supporting the majority’s conclusion that women “regret their choices,
and consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of self44
esteem.’” The dissent also argued that, if women’s informed consent were a legitimate concern, the proper state response would be to
require physicians to inform women of the different procedures and
their risks, rather than “deprive[] women of the right to make an au45
tonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.” Ginsburg’s
dissent decried the paternalism inherent in the majority decision,
cautioning that the majority’s “way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitu46
tion—ideas that have long since been discredited.”
41
42

43

44
45
46

Id. at 167.
See id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The law saves not a single fetus from destruction,
for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion
Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“Justice Ginsburg argued that the Act furthered no legitimate
governmental interests, and in fact did not even further the government’s asserted interest in protecting potential life, due to the availability of alternative late-term abortion
procedures.”).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court’s paternalistic views of “women’s place in the family and under the Constitution”
were long ago “discredited”); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (discussing Justice
Ginsburg’s alarm over the majority’s view of the proper role of women).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority); see
also Turner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (quoting the highlighted passage).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Turner, supra
note 5, at 19 (quoting the highlighted passage).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Turner, supra note
5, at 19 (quoting the highlighted passage). Justice Ginsburg cites, as examples, Bradwell v.
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The dissent noted that the majority opinion compromised the
health exception requirement set forth in Roe, Casey, and Stenberg and
for the first time accepted a ban on an abortion procedure without a
47
health exception. It argued that the majority’s conclusion that a facial challenge required a showing that the ban was unconstitutional
in “a large fraction of relevant cases” was inconsistent with both
precedent and logic. The Court has considered and upheld numerous facial attacks on abortion statutes since Roe, including a nearly
48
identical attack in Stenberg. The majority’s holding that a successful
facial challenge to the ban would need to show medical necessity in a
large fraction of relevant cases made little sense given that “[t]he very
purpose of a health exception is to protect women in the exceptional
49
cases.”
The dissent also argued that there is, in fact, no real medical uncertainty. Congress’s findings were based on a small number of ideologically-driven health care providers and contained numerous errors, in contrast with the substantial medical authority stating that the
banned procedure is, in certain circumstances, far safer than the al50
ternatives. The dissent concluded that the majority opinion conflicted with Supreme Court precedent holding that the state may not

47

48

49

50

Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908),
discussed infra Section V.A.3.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.”); see also Dorf,
supra note 5, at 821–22 (discussing how the Court decided to uphold the PBABA despite
the lack of exception to safeguard the health of the mother).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This holding is
perplexing given that, in materially identical circumstances we held that a statute lacking
a health exception was unconstitutional on its face.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion
Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“[T]he dissent lamented the Court’s rejection of a facial attack, since such challenges had been approved in similar circumstances . . . .).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued:
Casey makes clear that, in determining whether any restriction poses an undue
burden on a “large fraction” of women, the relevant class is not “all women,” nor
“all pregnant women,” nor even all women “seeking abortions.” Rather, a provision restricting access to abortion, “must be judged by reference to those [women]
for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.” Thus the absence of
a health exception burdens all women for whom it is relevant—women who, in the
judgment of their doctors, require an intact D&E because other procedures would
place their health at risk.
Id. at 188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 174–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he congressional findings on
which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act rests do not withstand inspection, as the lower
courts have determined and this Court is obliged to concede”); see also Dorf, supra note 5,
at 822 (“Congress could only find a small number of ideologically-driven doctors to say
that the procedure is never necessary. And even those doctors did not quite say that.”).
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subject women to health risks by forcing women to resort to less safe
51
methods of abortion.
D. Reconciling the Two Interpretations: What Does Carhart Really Say?
While Carhart does not overrule Stenberg and states that Casey is
controlling, it is a significant departure from past abortion jurisprudence on several grounds. First, it expands the “fetal life” state interest far beyond what Roe and its progeny intended, essentially recognizing new state interests in promoting respect for human life and
protecting women from medical decisions they might regret. It holds
that no health exception is necessary if there is uncertainty regarding
health risks in the majority of cases. More disturbing, it allows for
such uncertainty to be generated through the use of flimsy evidence.
Together, the recognition of new state interests and devaluing of
women’s autonomy and health imply that the state may pursue these
new state interests even where they significantly compromise the
health of women.
While the majority opinion cites Casey to argue that it is furthering
the state interest in protecting fetal life, what it actually furthers is far
more abstract. As the dissent notes, PBABA does not further the
52
state’s interest in protecting fetal life because it saves no fetal lives.
The majority broadly interprets the state’s interest in fetal life to include a symbolic purpose of “express[ing] respect for the dignity of
53
human life.” Thus, the majority interprets the state’s interest in protecting fetal life to include the state’s simple, even if ineffectual, expression of moral opposition to abortion even where no fetal lives are
54
saved as a direct result.
51

52

53

54

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 172–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Court
has consistently required that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in
all cases, safeguard a woman’s health”).
Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269
(describing Ginsburg’s argument as to why PBABA does not further the state interest of
protecting life); see also Gordon, supra note 5, at 753 (describing how the Gonzales v. Carhart majority “accepted as sufficient the rationale that [PBABA] furthered the state’s interest in ‘preserving and promoting fetal life’ even when, as the dissent noted, the law
seems unlikely to actually save any fetuses because it merely outlaws a single method of
abortion”); Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (highlighting that the statue does not prevent
abortions and thus “does not further a state’s interest in the potentiality of human life”).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 824 (“[I]n banning a
procedure that looks uncomfortably like infanticide, Congress aimed to preserve the line
between infanticide and abortion.”).
See Dorf, supra note 5, at 823–24 (“[T]he [Gonzales v. Carhart] Court expanded the state’s
expressive interest in describing its moral opposition to abortion . . . .”). While Casey did
uphold the state’s ability to promote respect for fetal life, it did not recognize this as a dis-
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Carhart implies that the state’s interest in fetal life justifies state action that is directed at sending a message to society in general about
the morality of a particular method of abortion. Concerned about
the procedure’s effect of “coarsen[ing] society to the humanity of not
only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life,” the
Court allows the state to ban an abortion procedure in order to
55
“promote respect for life, including the life of the unborn.” The in56
tended impact is not on fetal lives, but rather society as a whole.
The decision also recognizes a new state interest in protecting the
maternal-fetal relationship and protecting women from the regret the
Court assumes they will feel should they harm that relationship. The
Court frames this interest in terms of protecting women’s health. Casey recognized that a state interest in protecting women’s health may
justify an abortion regulation as long as the regulation does not
create an undue burden on women’s right to an abortion. Carhart
reasons that PBABA furthers this interest because: (1) there is a special relationship between women and the children they carry; (2) because of this special relationship, a woman may regret her decision to
have an abortion, particularly an abortion that used the banned procedure; and (3) women may suffer psychological harm due to their
regret. By banning the procedure, the Court argues, the state is protecting women from making a decision that may harm their psychological health.
While the majority argued that it was somehow protecting informed consent, the majority decision actually eliminated women’s
ability to make an informed medical decision rather than providing

55
56

tinct state interest justifying abortion restrictions. Rather, Casey allowed the state to advance its interest in protecting fetal life through “informed consent” requirements meant
to impress upon a pregnant woman the state’s respect for fetal life, and thereby persuade
her not to have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
878 (1992) (upholding the state’s informed consent requirements). Casey states that:
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy
the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
Id. (emphasis added). Expression of respect for life was therefore permitted only as a
means to protect fetal life—the state action must be intended to persuade women considering abortion to forego abortion. In contrast, PBABA saves no fetal lives—the expression of respect for fetal life to society in general is the end in itself.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157–58.
See Dorf, supra note 5, at 824 (“The audience for partial-birth abortion bans, the audience
for the expression of Congress’s condemnation of this form of abortion, is not just individual women . . . but the population as a whole.”); see also John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 51–52 (2009–2010) (using Carhart as an
example of the Court’s approval of a regulation used to promote moral values, independent of any justification based on harm to life).
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them with additional information to make a more informed choice.
It rests its decision on a baseless assumption, lacking credible evi58
dence, about the psychological harm abortion must cause women.
Citing the “bond of love” the Court assumes the mother feels for her
unborn child and the profound regret women must feel after abortion, the Court implies that pregnant women do not have the same
ability to make informed medical choices as the rest of the population, and that the state is therefore justified in making these decisions
59
for them. The majority delineates pregnant women as a unique
class of persons who cannot make informed decisions, at least with
regard to decisions that may harm the unique bond they share with
the fetus they carry.
As the dissent argues, this reasoning is acutely paternalistic, reflecting traditional notions about a woman’s place in society as a
mother rather than more recent jurisprudence allowing women to
choose their own place in society. The dissent compares the majority’s reasoning to cases discussed infra, Section 0, in which the Court
accepted state mandates that limited women’s ability to pursue employment because such employment might interfere with their roles
as mothers and their ability to bear healthy children for the benefit of
60
society. Kennedy’s insistence that the bond of love between a mother and child can be used to limit women’s access to abortion procedures is in direct conflict with Casey, which explicitly rejects the state
using a woman’s reproductive capability to “insist . . . upon its own vi-

57

58

59

60

See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice . . . .”); see also Dorf, supra note
5, at 823 (arguing that, because the state chooses to ban the procedure rather than promote more information about it, the state interest cannot be an interest in informed
choice).
See Turner, supra note 5, at 22–28, 40–42 (discussing the importance of the development
of, and Court endorsement of, the “women’s regret” rationale); Tepich, supra note 13, at
384 (stating that the Court “chooses to criminalize an abortion procedure to protect
women from themselves”).
The reasoning that women do not really understand what they are doing when they have
abortions is common rhetoric of the anti-choice movement. See Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 991, 1008–10 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] (discussing women-protective justifications for an abortion ban in South Dakota).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908) and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 19–21 (citing pertinent passages from Muller v. Oregon); infra Section
V.A.3.
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sion of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in
61
the course of our history and our culture.”
The decision also undermines the health exception requirement
set forth in Roe and its progeny. Cases such as Roe, Casey, and Stenberg
62
treat the health exception as a distinct requirement. Carhart treats
the health exception as part of the undue burden analysis, concluding that the lack of health exception is acceptable because it does not
63
pose an undue burden. Analyzing the health exception under the
undue burden analysis makes little sense, given that the health exception is required even after viability, when states may prohibit abortion
altogether.
Perhaps more important, Carhart does not require a health exception where there is uncertainty about whether the banned procedure
may be medically necessary. The Court reasons that, in areas of medical uncertainty, it will accept legislative judgment about what is med64
ically necessary. This stands in stark contrast to past cases, including
Stenberg, in which the Court held that medical uncertainty requires
65
that courts find a ban unconstitutional. It also conflicts with prior
decisions, including Roe, stating that the decision whether to have an
abortion for medical reasons must be left to patients as guided by the
66
professional judgment of physicians.
61

62

63
64

65

66

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 21 (emphasizing the way in which the Gonzales v. Carhart Court’s holding
contradicts the holding of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey).
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929–31 (2000) (finding that Nebraska’s statute
banning partial-birth abortions violates the Constitution, Roe, and Casey); see also B. Jessie
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86
TEX. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2007) (discussing the Stenberg Court’s rationale for finding the
Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortions to be unconstitutional).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164 (providing passages suggesting that the Court
merged the health exception into the undue burden analysis).
See id. at 163 (“The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical uncertainty persists. The Court’s precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial attack.”); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (arguing that there was actually medical certainty
of the necessity of partial-birth abortions because Congress had a difficult time finding an
expert to testify that a partial-birth abortion is never medically necessary); Gordon, supra
note 5, at 753 (discussing the dangerous precedent set by the Court in deferring to legislative, rather than medical, judgment in Gonzales v. Carhart).
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 937–38 (holding that a Nebraska statute banning partialbirth abortion was unconstitutional due to its lack of an exception to safeguard the health
of the mother); see also Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 173–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court has consistently required that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of
pregnancy and in all cases, safeguard a woman’s health.”); Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (discussing how the Court’s deference to legislative judgment over medical judgment conflicts with the holding of Stenberg).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (describing how, during the early stages of
pregnancy, the decision whether to have an abortion should be made by the physician
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The Carhart decision also showed a troubling willingness to accept
flimsy medical evidence in order to support a finding of “medical uncertainty.” The dissent and the district court opinions cited substantial evidence from numerous recognized physicians and medical authorities detailing how an intact D&E may be medically necessary in
67
various circumstances. In contrast, Congress’s findings were based
on the testimony of physicians with no training in or experience with
68
intact D&E and who performed abortions only on rare occasions.
The majority allowed small amounts of questionable evidence to negate the need for a health exception by deferring to Congress based
69
on the “uncertainty” created by this testimony.
III. COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN
A. Introduction
Despite common law and, more recently, constitutional law principles recognizing and protecting the right to refuse medical treatment, pregnancy is often viewed as a special case by courts. Courts
have intervened in the medical treatment of pregnant women in ways
they have not dared with the non-pregnant. Courts have allowed

67

68

69

and his patient); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (discussing how precedent suggests that
“the decision whether to have a therapeutic abortion should be left to patients as guided
by the professional medical judgment of their physicians”).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 174–79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing evidence from
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004)).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how some of
the more highly qualified experts who provided the Court with evidence about the D&E
procedure suggested that it was the safest available procedure in certain circumstances).
The facial/as-applied distinction the majority uses to justify the lack of health exception
falls apart on examination. The facial attack has been the primary means of challenging
abortion regulation statutes since Roe, including a nearly identical attack in Stenberg. Id. at
187–88; see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“[T]he dissent lamented the Court’s rejection of a facial attack, since such challenges had been approved
in similar circumstances . . . .”). Such facial attacks need not demonstrate that a health
exception is needed in a large fraction of cases given that “[t]he very purpose of the
health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at
189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is also worth noting that the respondents challenged
PBABA both on its face and as-applied to particular doctors. See Dorf, supra note 5, at 825
(discussing how Gonzales v. Carhart was brought as both a facial and an as-applied challenge). If the Court was stating that an as-applied challenge must be brought by particular pregnant women, this is likely to impose significant obstacles on those seeking to challenge PBABA—a plaintiff facing a difficult and personal medical decision must be willing
to lay bare her medical history and decision to have an abortion, knowing that the slow
pace of litigation will make it all but impossible for her to obtain relief in time to secure
the procedure that best serves her health. See id. at 825.
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state intervention in pregnant women’s medical treatment choices on
the grounds that the state has an interest in fetal life, as outlined by
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence. Pre-Carhart abortion cases
provided very limited support for state intervention in the treatment
of pregnant women. Intervention could only be contemplated when
the fetus’s very life was at stake. Even then, the uncertainty with
which intervention was needed to save the life weakened the state’s
interest. Supreme Court jurisprudence also foreclosed the possibility
of intervention when it would compromise the health of the mother.
Thus, invasive medical procedures that would put the mother’s
health or life at risk could not be compelled for the sake of furthering the state’s interest in fetal life.
B. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Under state common law, the right to refuse medical treatment is
grounded in the concept of autonomy. It is closely related to the
right to informed consent, with some courts citing additional support
in the common law or constitutional right to privacy and bodily inte70
grity. These rights share the common thread of respect for an indi71
vidual’s right to autonomy. Informed consent promotes patient autonomy by requiring physicians to inform patients of their diagnosis,
the alternative treatments and their consequences (including the
consequence of no treatment), and their recommendations for
72
treatment so that a patient is able to make a meaningful choice.
70
71

72

See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (outlining pertinent
cases).
See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1754–56 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity] (discussing
how the right to refuse medical treatment and the right to informed consent both relate
to principles of autonomous decision making).
See id. at 1754–55 (discussing the importance of informed consent); see also COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 227 (2006–
2007) (“The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.”); Pamala Harris, Note,
Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights,
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (2001) (“The general rule of medical treatment is that doctors may not act without a patient’s informed consent. Informed consent promotes patient autonomy and safeguards the integrity of the physician.”) (footnotes omitted). Tort
law recognizes this by holding a health care provider who does not obtain informed consent before treating a patient liable for battery because the provider has intruded on the
bodily autonomy of the individual. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914) (“[A] surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”); Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices
During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 596 (1989) (“A
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The logical corollary of informed consent is the right to exercise au73
tonomy by withholding consent and refusing treatment. Similarly,
the right to privacy and bodily integrity protects the right to be let
alone from government interference, particularly with regard to bo74
dily autonomy.
The common law right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute. Courts have recognized four countervailing state interests that
may be used to override a patient’s right to refuse treatment: (1) the
prevention of suicide; (2) the preservation of life; (3) the protection
of third parties; and (4) the preservation of the ethical integrity of
75
the medical profession. The right to refuse treatment strengthens,
and state interest weakens, as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and likelihood that the treatment would effectively treat the patient
76
decreases.
While all of these exceptions are limited and rarely employed, it is
particularly important to note that the protection of third parties has
only been applied in very limited circumstances. In general, it is well
accepted that the state cannot compel an individual to undergo medical treatment for the benefit of another, even where doing so would
77
save the life of a third party. The classic case cited for this proposi-

73
74

75

76

77

doctor must obtain consent before treating the patient or the unauthorized contact will
be deemed a battery.”); see also SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY: THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 6–7 (2005) (discussing how the law protects an individual’s decision to obtain or refuse medical treatment); Harris, supra, at 134 (describing how
a doctor may be able to obtain a court order to compel treatment if a pregnant woman
refuses).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
See Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396–97 (Mass. 1983) (finding that a pregnant woman,
entitled to the constitutional right of privacy, is permitted to exercise this right by refusing medical treatment).
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (stating the same four state interests); MEREDITH, supra note
72, at 46–50 (detailing the four countervailing state interests); Goldberg, supra note 72, at
597 (noting the same four countervailing state interests).
See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (noting that a state’s interest weakens as
the degree of bodily invasion grows), abrogated on other grounds by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (N.J. 1989); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 19-4 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing a state’s remedies when a fetus is neglected or harmed by the pregnant woman);
Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 55–56 (1987) (noting the necessity of judicial inquiry in each case, and
the, often, incomplete and conflicting evidence that judges find).
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, § 19–2 (“The law does not recognize any circumstance
when a person must undergo a medical procedure for the benefit of another person.”);
see also Cheryl E. Amana, Drugs, AIDS and Reproductive Choice: Maternal-State Conflict Continues into the Millennium, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 32, 57 (2005) (“A woman should not be
treated differently based on her pregnancy, but that does not mean that she will not
be.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 23–24 (discussing Judge Flaherty’s order in McFall v.
Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978), which rested upon the duty to rescue theory in refus-
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tion is McFall v. Shimp, in which a court declined to order a man to
78
donate bone marrow that would save his cousin’s life. The court
held that:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or take action
to save another human being or to rescue. . . . For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would
defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which
79
would know no limits . . . .

For this reason, the third party exception is somewhat controversial
80
and has only been applied in rare circumstances.
In 1990, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional dimension to the common law right to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan

78

79
80

ing to compel an individual to undergo treatment to benefit another); Michael A. Grizzi,
Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 473,
488–89 & n.70 (1995) (noting that courts are “wary” of having one individual undergo a
medical treatment to benefit the other individual, who is the fetus); Howard Minkoff &
Lynn M. Paltrow, The Rights of “Unborn Children” and the Value of Pregnant Women, 36
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 26, 27 (2006) [hereinafter Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn
Children] (discussing how worrisome it is that laws have elevated the rights of the fetus to
the rights of the pregnant woman); Terri-Ann Samuels et al., Obstetricians, Health Attorneys,
and Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 17 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 107, 108 (2007) (noting
that it is not within the framework of our law to compel one individual to undergo medical treatment to benefit another).
McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (1978) (noting that a court has no authority to
compel one person to undergo treatment to benefit another person); see also FURROW ET
AL., supra note 76, §19-4 n.5 (citing Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, to state that
children born alive can sue their parents); Amana, supra note 77, at 57 (“As with McFall v.
Shimp, it is difficult to change the questionable moral obligation into a legal one.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 23–24 (citing McFall, and Judge Flaherty’s refusal to compel one
individual to undergo a bone marrow procedure to save his cousin); Grizzi, supra note 77,
at 488–89 & n.70 (noting the courts refusal to allow one person to undergo medical
treatment on behalf of another); Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note
77, at 27 (citing McFall as stating that courts have preceluded forced surgeries to benefit
“born persons”); Samuels et al., supra note 77, at 108 (quoting the McFall decision).
McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91.
These circumstances are limited to matters concerning the general public health and
dependents who might be abandoned by the patient’s death. See MEREDITH, supra note
72, at 48 (citing the outcome of a case which held that the state’s interest in protecting a
patient’s children outweighed the patient’s right to refuse treatment); Gallagher, supra
note 76, at 23–26 (explaining that judicial refusal to allow one person to be compelled
physically to aid another is based on the common law principle of self-determination); Eric M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold
Question, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 281–82 (1994) (addressing financial and emotional
concerns of leaving a child without a parent, and concerns that threaten public health
and safety); Robin M. Trindel, Note, Fetal Interests vs. Maternal Rights: Is the State Going Too
Far?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 743, 749 (1991) (noting the state’s interest in the protection of a
dependent third party in cases where a pregnant woman’s decisions may result in abandonment of a minor child).
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81

v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. Recognizing a common law
right to refuse medical treatment rooted in the right to informed
consent, the Court held that there was a constitutionally protected li82
berty interest in refusing medical treatment. The Court cited cases
recognizing the right to be let alone from bodily intrusion in the context of searches and seizures involving the body; an unwanted medical examination for the purposes of discovery in a civil action; an unwanted vaccination that would compromise the patient’s health; the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs; mandatory behavior
83
modification; and unnecessary confinement for medical treatment.
The Court also cited the four countervailing state interests that it
identified in the context of the common law right to refuse medical
treatment: (1) the prevention of suicide; (2) the preservation of life;
(3) the protection of third parties; and (4) the preservation of the
84
ethical integrity of the medical profession. Thus, it is likely that the
analysis for balancing an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment under the Constitution against relevant state interests is similar
or identical to that of the common law.

81
82

83

84

497 U.S. 261 (1990).
See id. at 278–79 (following other cases which support a liberty interest in refusing to receive medical treatment). While the majority opinion recognizes a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, three Justices dissented, arguing that the Constitution provides
a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. See id. at 302–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 269, 278–79 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S 250, 251 (1891) (“No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”);
see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (noting the existence of “a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 494 (1980) (stating that transport to a medical center along with forcible behavioral
treatment was against one’s liberty interest); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979)
(“[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . .”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439
(1957) (“As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable . . . must
be set the interests of society . . . .”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905)
(noting that the court balanced a person’s interest in declining a smallpox vaccine versus
the State’s interest in public health).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
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C. The State Interest in Fetal Life as a Legal Justification for Compelled
Treatment
Courts overriding a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treat85
ment justify their decision by citing a countervailing state interest in
fetal life. This can be viewed as either the state interest in protecting
life, the state interest in protecting third parties, or a combination of
86
the two. However, protection of fetal life does not fit neatly into the
four countervailing state interests identified in Section III.B. Some
courts and commentators have cited it as a separate, fifth state interest, noting that preservation of life refers to the life of the decision
maker, and that the third-party exception has been limited to born
87
children and the public health.
The Supreme Court recognized a state interest in protecting fetal
life in Roe v. Wade. While in Roe the Supreme Court made clear that
88
the fetus is not a person under the 14th Amendment, it also held
85

86
87

88

Courts generally compel medical treatment through a court order, which is often accompanied by an order awarding custody of the fetus, and therefore custody of the mother, to
a state agency or hospital. Most compelled treatment cases do not result in reported opinions, making them difficult to track and limiting public scrutiny. See Nancy K. Rhoden,
The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergency of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1951, 1951 (1986). A New England Journal of Medicine study published over twenty years
ago that tracked court-ordered medical treatment of pregnant women found twenty-one
cases of court orders being sought for Cesarean surgeries. See Veronika E. B. Kolder et
al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192 (1987). Orders
were obtained in 86% of the cases in which they were sought, spanning eleven states. See
id. In addition, hospital detentions were obtained in two states. See id. However, there
are only a handful of reported cases from this period. See infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. The practice of obtaining court ordered medical treatment has continued throughout the last two decades. See, e.g., Lisa Collier Cool, Could You Be Forced to
Have a C-Section?, BABY TALK, May 20, 2005, at 56, 57; LYNN M. PALTROW, NAT’L
ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, COERCIVE MEDICINE (Mar. 21, 2004),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/Coercive_Medicine.pdf (outlining numerous cases and incidents where a court has forced a woman to undergo a C-section even
though the woman wished not to do so).
See Trindel, supra note 80, at 749–50 (noting that a state’s interest may be in preserving
“life” or protecting the “innocent third party”).
See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (discussing the four
countervailing state interests but then resting on the “ultimate issue, the State’s interest in
protecting the viable fetus”); see also Goldberg, supra note 72, at 597–99 (stating that “no
trade-off between a woman’s health and the state’s interest in protecting potential life is
permissible”); Levine, supra note 80, at 278–87 (noting the distinction between the preservation of life and the preservation of potential life, and the State’s interest in protecting third parties such as already born, minor children).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58, 162 (1973) (noting that the word “persons” in the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only postnatally and does not include the unborn); see
also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 40 (noting that the United States has never treated the
unborn as though they were a “person”); Goldberg, supra note 72, at 601 (explaining
that, as determined by Roe, the Fourteenth Amendment’s use of “person” does not in-
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that the state has a legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in
protecting not only the health of the woman, but also the life of the
fetus. In Roe, the Court identified the state’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life,” which becomes compelling at viabili89
ty. The Court identified viability as a turning point at which “the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
90
mother’s womb.” At that point, the state may regulate and even

89
90

clude a fetus). Historically, the U.S. legal system treated the fetus as part of the woman
bearing it and afforded it no separate rights. See Harris, supra note 72, at 137 (stating that
the fetus is legally perceived as part of the woman and thus has no “recognized legal existence”); Trindel, supra note 80, at 745 (describing the fetus as one that lacks existence or
personality due to its attachment to the mother, making it unable to pursue a legal
claim); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600–01 (1986) (noting
that the law was reluctant to provide a fetus with legal rights since it is not a person in the
whole sense). To the extent fetal rights were recognized, they were contingent upon live
birth and were available only against third parties and not against the mother. See id. at
600–02. For example, fetuses were granted the status of a person for the limited purpose
of inheritance, provided the fetus was subsequently born alive, in order to effect parents’
wishes to provide for children not yet born at the time of their death. See id. at 601. After
1946, tort law in some states began to allow children born alive to recover against third
parties for injuries inflicted while they were in the womb. See Developments in the Law—
State Intervention During Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1559 (1990) [hereinafter Developments—State Intervention]; Goldberg, supra note 72, at 600–01 (noting that in some jurisdictions, the requirement that a live birth occur in order for a suit to be brought has
been abandoned); Johnsen, supra, at 601–02 (explaining that the purpose of tort law—to
compensate victims and deter such harmful conduct—is consistent with allowing a child
to recover against third parties for conduct inflicted upon the pregnant mother). Criminal law traditionally punished only third-party assaults on a fetus that survived birth. See
Developments—State Intervention, at 1560.
Over the past few decades, legislatures and courts have eroded the legal distinction
between born children and those in utero. In recent years, several states have amended
existing murder statutes or enacted specific feticide statutes, imposing criminal sanctions
against third parties even if the fetus died before birth. See id. at 1559. Similarly, states
now recognize wrongful death recovery against third parties for harm to a viable fetus
that dies before birth. See Developments—State Intervention, at 1559; Harris, supra note 72,
at 745; see also Johnsen, supra, at 602. While by virtue of their exclusion of mothers from
liability these statutes do not directly conflict with the rights of mothers, they represent a
conceptual move by recognizing fetal rights independent of the pregnant woman. See id.
at 603–04.
More troubling, however, is the recognition of actions on behalf of the fetus against
the pregnant woman for her conduct during pregnancy. States have amended—or courts
have interpreted—child abuse statutes to cover not only born children, but also fetuses.
See Developments—State Intervention, supra, at 1574–75; Johnsen, supra, at 604–05. Some
courts have interpreted criminal statutes protecting fetuses to hold women liable for conduct during pregnancy even where the statutes unambiguously exclude pregnant women
from liability. See Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note 77, at 26.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; see also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 15 (quoting Roe regarding the
state’s interest in potential life).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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proscribe abortion, subject to an exception for the life or health of
91
the mother.
Courts have interpreted this state interest as providing legal
grounds to override a pregnant woman’s right to refuse treatment.
For example, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., the Northern District of Florida held that a pregnant woman’s rights were not violated by a court-ordered Cesarean surgery and
92
blood transfusion. Citing Roe for the proposition that a State possesses an “increasing interest in preserving a fetus as it progresses toward viability,” the court concluded that “[w]hatever the scope of Ms.
Pemberton’s personal constitutional rights in this situation, they
clearly did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in pre93
serving the life of the unborn child.” Indeed, every post-Roe reported opinion compelling the medical treatment of a pregnant
woman for the benefit of the fetus has relied on Roe in its argument
that the state’s interest in fetal life outweighs the mother’s right to
94
refuse treatment.
D. Limitations of the State Interest in Fetal Life as a Legal Justification for
Compelled Medical Treatment
Until Carhart, Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence provided
limited support for the assertion that the state’s interest in fetal life
can override a pregnant woman’s right to refuse medical treatment.
This is in part because of the inherent limitations in applying abortion jurisprudence to medical treatment cases, as well as the primacy
Roe and its progeny put on a woman’s health.
One of the limitations of applying abortion jurisprudence to
compelled treatment is that the state interest in fetal life is not implicated in the same manner in compelled treatment cases. In the con91
92
93
94

See id. at 163–64 (noting that a state may proscribe abortion if the fetus is viable and it will
not endanger the health of the woman).
66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
Id. at 1251.
See id.; In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233, 2239 (D.C. 1986) (citing Roe to discuss the state’s compelling interest in forcing treatment); In re Jamaica Hospital, 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899–900 (1985) (noting that the state’s interest increases and becomes
compelling when the fetus reaches viability); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp.
Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that the intrusion involved
in the treatment is outweighed by the state’s interest in the fetus); see also In re A.C., 533
A.2d 611, 613–15, 617 (App. D.C. 1987) (noting the difference between a woman’s right
to an abortion and her obligations to the fetus once it becomes viable), vacated 573 A.2d
1235 (App. D.C. 1990). A court refusing to compel treatment also recognized the state’s
interest in fetal rights under Roe as the crux of the argument for the parties urging compelled treatment. See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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text of abortion, fetal life will certainly be terminated; this is one of
the purposes of abortion. However, medical treatment cases do not
involve the purposeful termination of fetal life. Instead, they concern
differences of opinion in how to achieve a live birth. While abortion
involves the certain termination of fetal life, medical treatment cases
involve disagreements over risk to fetal life.
Some medical treatment cases involve disagreement over what is
an acceptable degree of risk to fetal life. For example, in Pemberton,
the patient argued that vaginal delivery did not pose an appreciable
95
risk to the fetus. Five physicians had testified that the risk of uterine
96
One physician estirupture, however, was “unacceptably high.”
mated the risk at 4 to 6%, and another placed the risk at between 2%
97
and 2.2%. Although the court stated that uterine rupture would result in “almost certain death” to the fetus, the one physician it cited
98
estimated a 50% chance of fetal death if uterine rupture occurred.
The Northern District of Florida held that these odds posed unac99
ceptable risk to the fetus. However, a medical decision that allows a
1-3% chance of fetal death implicates a far different degree of state
interest in fetal life than an abortion.
Physician uncertainty also raises the question of whether statistics
themselves can be trusted to provide an accurate assessment of risk
and whether a given risk even exists. Medicine is inherently imprecise, and physicians often overestimate the potential harm to the fe100
tus and the need for intervention. In In re Baby Boy Doe, a mother
delivered a healthy baby vaginally despite her physician’s urging to
the court that insufficient oxygen flow to the fetus would result in the
baby being born dead or severely retarded unless a Cesarean surgery

95
96
97
98
99
100

Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1252–53 (N.D. Fla.
1999).
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting the substantial risk of uterine rupture and death to the fetus).
See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 6, 65–66 (noting numerous cases where the medical outcome differed from the percentages given by the doctors); Janna C. Merrick, Caring for the
Fetus to Protect the Born Child? Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Coerced Obstetrical Intervention, in
THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY: POLICY DILEMMAS IN THE MATERNAL-FETAL RELATIONSHIP
63, 73–75 (Janna C. Merrick & Robert H. Blank eds., 1993) (discussing several cases
where medical percentages suggested that vaginal delivery was impossible and yet successful vaginal deliveries occurred); Developments—State Intervention, supra note 88, at 1583
(“First, medicine is an inherently imprecise science.”); Trindel, supra note 80, at 757–58
(stating that doctors cannot make entirely accurate guesses as medical uncertainty usually
exists).
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101

was performed. In an unreported Colorado case, an order compelling a Cesarean surgery was granted only to discover that the diagno102
A 1987 New
sis of fetal hypoxia prompting surgery was incorrect.
England Journal of Medicine survey showed that physicians inaccurately
predicted harm to the fetus in over twenty-eight percent of the cases
103
in which court orders compelling treatment were sought.
Changing medical knowledge underscores the uncertainty underlying the state’s interest in fetal life in medical treatment cases. Thirty years ago, a diabetic pregnant woman’s refusal of DES treatment
104
and an x-ray would be considered a danger to her fetus. Physicians
now know that these procedures endanger the fetus and would undermine, rather than further, any state interest in fetal life to compel
them. While changing medical knowledge may introduce more
grounds for medical intervention, it is also likely to undermine the
need for several interventions that physicians now feel are optimal or
necessary. For example, many experts are beginning to question the
efficacy of electronic fetal monitoring (EFM), which is commonly
used to determine the need for Cesarean surgery due to fetal dis105
tress.
Even to the extent that the state’s interest in fetal life is indicated
in medical treatment cases, the primacy of the mother’s health limits
the state’s ability to compel medical treatment. Roe provides that,
while the state’s compelling interest in fetal life allows it to proscribe
abortion in the third trimester, it may not proscribe abortion when
106
doing so would endanger the life or health of the mother. Health
101

102

103

104

105
106

See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 327, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that, although a doctor determined that an immediate C-section was necessary, the vaginal birth
produced a healthy baby); see also George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest
Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1982) [hereinafter Annas, Forced Cesareans]
(showing that a medical diagnosis is not always accurate and arguing that a woman
should be able to decide what procedures to have done regarding her fetus).
See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 16 (quoting the doctor who stated that the
case “simply underscores the limitations of continuous fetal heart monitoring as a means
of predicting neonatal outcome”).
See Kolder et al., supra note 85, at 1195 (noting that the prediction of harm to the fetus
was incorrect in six of twenty-one cases (just over 28%)); Trindel, supra note 80, at 757
(noting that doctors incorrectly predicted harm to the fetus in six of twenty-one cases that
were reported).
See Thomas B. Mackenzie et al., Commentary, Case Studies: When a Pregnant Woman Endangers Her Fetus, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 25 (1986) (suggesting a potential problem
that may have occurred twenty-five years ago regarding fetal treatment).
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (noting that abortion during viability may
be proscribed except when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother); see also
Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 17 (discussing that the state’s compelling interest in preserving the life of the fetus does not outweigh the interest in the life or health of
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must be broadly construed, encompassing not only physical well107
being, but also psychological and emotional well-being. Even after
viability, when a state’s interest in fetal life becomes “compelling,”
states may not pursue this interest at the expense of a woman’s
health. In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed that the state
108
cannot sacrifice maternal health for the sake of preserving fetal life.
The logical corollary to this principle is that, even if the state’s interest in fetal life ever allows it to mandate medical treatment of a
pregnant woman against her will, the state may not do so if treatment
would come at the expense of the woman’s health. Courts should be
foreclosed from mandating any treatment that would benefit the fetus but would pose health risks to the mother. The requirement that
state interests in fetal life may not be pursued at the expense of fetal
health is reflected in case law in which courts contemplate intervening to further state interest in fetal life. In general, while some
courts, citing Roe, have been willing to intervene to mandate medical
treatment of pregnant women for the benefit of the fetus, these cases
have been limited to situations in which the treatment was arguably

107

108

the mother); Goldberg, supra note 72, at 619 (explaining that “exemptions from state
proscriptions on abortions are available for the health of the mother”); Levine, supra note
80, at 258 (stating that the state may not prevent an abortion if doing so endangers the
mother’s health); Trindel, supra note 80, at 750 (noting that no court has held that a
woman must jeopardize her own health in order to protect her fetus).
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (noting that medical well-being extends to
physical, emotional, psychological and familial considerations); United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62, 71–72 (1971) (discussing a holding that allowed an abortion for mental
health reasons); see also Goldberg, supra note 72, at 619 (“Health has been broadly defined.”); Levine, supra note 80, at 258 (stating that a woman’s “health” must be broadly
construed to include physical, psychological and emotional well-being).
In Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, the Court considered a statute that
required a physician performing a post-viability abortion to exercise reasonable care to
preserve the life and health of the fetus and to perform a technique that would provide a
fetus with the best chance to be aborted alive unless it would pose a significantly greater
medical risk to maternal life or health. 476 U.S. 747, 768 (1986), overruled on other
grounds, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court held
that the statute was unconstitutional because it required a trade-off between maternal
health and fetal life rather than requiring “that maternal health be the physician’s paramount consideration.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768–69; see also Levine, supra note 80, at
259 (noting a court’s issue with a Pennsylvania statute that balanced consideration for the
fetus’s life with consideration for maternal health); Trindel, supra note 80, at 750–51
(discussing the Thornburg decision and the unconstitutionality of an act that required a
“trade off” between fetal health and maternal health). The Court sustained the primacy
of a women’s health over the state interest in fetal life in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, reaffirming the health exception requirement. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
846, 850–51, 872, 879, 880 (continuing to note the primacy of the woman’s health when
considering whether an abortion is a necessity).
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in the medical interests of both the fetus and the mother.
Courts
do not always compel treatment where it is in the pregnant woman’s

109

With the exception of one case decided prior to Roe, every reported case of compelled
medical treatment of a pregnant woman that I found occurred in circumstances in which
the physicians could argue that treatment would benefit the mother’s health as well as the
fetus.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital, a 1981 case, the Supreme Court of
Georgia gave the state temporary custody of a fetus and ordered a woman in her thirtyninth week of pregnancy to submit to a sonogram and Cesarean surgery. 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) (per curiam). The patient had complete placenta previa, and physicians estimated that there was a 99% chance that her child would not survive a vaginal delivery,
and a 50% chance that she would not survive a vaginal delivery, as opposed to a near
100% chance that both mother and child would survive a Cesarean surgery. See id. at
458–59. The court concluded that the state’s interest in fetal life under Roe and Georgia
law outweighed the infringement on the mother’s “wishes.” See id. at 460.
In In re Jamaica Hospital, a New York trial court ordered a woman in her eighteenth
week of pregnancy to submit to a blood transfusion to save the life of the fetus. 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1985). The court based its intervention solely on the state’s interest in
preserving the life of the fetus under Roe, and acknowledged that it would not intervene if
the patient were not pregnant. See id. However, the transfusion was recommended to
save both the mother and the fetus. See id. The case has since been cited by other New
York trial courts for the proposition that courts may compel the medical treatment of
women in order to protect the health and welfare of a fetus. See, e.g., In re Guardianship
of Baby K, 727 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2001) (noting that the court has the authority to take action to protect the life of a fetus); see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 536
N.Y.S.2d 492, 496 (1989) (citing In re Jamaica Hospital for the proposition that protecting
health and welfare of a fetus is deemed “paramount” when a mother is refusing medical
treatment).
In In re Madyun, the District of Columbia Superior Court granted a hospital’s petition for an order compelling a pregnant patient at term to undergo a Cesarean surgery.
114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, 2240 (1986). The court held that, while a competent adult
may decline medical treatment for religious reasons, the state could override this decision
based on its interest in protecting fetal life delineated in Roe. Id. While the decision
speaks only in terms of risk to the fetus—and even acknowledges that the Cesarean surgery posed “minimal risks to the mother”—, see id., a subsequent decision by the same
court states that that the Cesarean surgery in Madyun was also recommended in the interest of the mother’s health. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 n.23 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)
(distinguishing A.C. from Madyun). In this later decision, the same court would vacate a
decision that ordered a Cesarean surgery that was not in the medical interests of the
mother, and hold that a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment should be respected in virtually all cases. See id. In doing so, the court distinguished Madyun in part
because the surgery in Madyun was in the interest of the mother. See id.
In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247
(1999), the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that an order
compelling a woman to submit to a cesarean section did not violate her constitutional
rights. Id. at 1257. The court relied on Roe and its progeny for the principle that, “by the
point of viability . . . the state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus outweighs the
mother’s own constitutional interest in determining whether she will bear a child.” Id. at
1251. Because “[b]earing an unwanted child is surely a greater intrusion on the mother’s
constitutional interests than undergoing a [C]esarean surgery to deliver a child that the
mother affirmatively desires to deliver,” the court concluded that “the state’s interest here
was greater, and the mother’s interest less, than during the third trimester situation ad-
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medical interest; for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois has ex110
plicitly stated that Illinois law prohibits courts from doing so. However, all reported decisions compelling the treatment of a pregnant
woman for the sake of the fetus occurred in circumstances in which
the physician could argue that the treatment would also benefit the
111
pregnant woman.
In contrast, where treatment would negatively
impact the mother’s health, courts have either refused to compel
112
treatment or have overturned compelled treatment on appeal.

110

111
112

dressed in Roe.” Id. at 1251–52. While the decision provided no discussion of how the
Cesarean surgery would impact the patient, the surgery was recommended to avoid uterine rupture, see id. at 1257, which would pose serious risks to the health and life of the
mother. See Kevin S. Toppenberg & William A. Block, Jr., Uterine Rupture: What Family
Physicians Need to Know, 66 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN. 823, 823, 826 (2002).
In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964)
(per curiam), the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a hospital’s appeal seeking a court
order to compel a blood transfusion for a woman in the thirty-second week of pregnancy.
Id. at 538. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus, ordered the guardian
“to consent to such blood transfusions as may be required and seek such other relief as
may be necessary to preserve the lives of the mother and the child,” and directed the trial
court to “direct the mother to submit to such blood transfusions.” Id. It acknowledged
that, while it was questionable whether an adult could be compelled to submit to transfusions to save her life, “the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with respect to sundry factual patterns which may develop.” Id. However, unlike the other cases
outlined in this footnote, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul was decided prior to Roe. Thus, in contrast to
the other cases outlined in this subsection, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul bases its holding upon the
court’s perception of the rights of the fetus, rather than the state interest in fetal life. In
a subsequent case, New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. L.V., a lower court has
since interpreted the New Jersey constitution to protect a pregnant woman’s right to
refuse medical treatment even if that refusal results in her death or the termination of
her pregnancy. 889 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that Illinois law
did not allow a mother to be compelled to undergo medical treatment that would help
her viable fetus).
See supra note 109.
In Taft v. Taft, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to order a cervical
cerclage, a suturing of the uterus, on a pregnant woman at risk of losing her pregnancy in
the fourth month due to an incompetent cervix. 446 N.E.2d 395, 395 (Mass. 1983). The
court cited the mother’s privacy rights and the fact that there were no findings based on
expert testimony that described the risks to the mother or to the fetus or “setting forth
whether the operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as a life-saving
procedure.” Id. at 397. The court also cited, in a footnote, the fact that the fetus was not
viable, distinguishing the case from Raleigh Fitkin-Paul and Jefferson on those grounds. See
id. at 397 n.4. Thus, the Taft decision may have left open the question of whether the
court would be willing to compel treatment if a fetus is viable and if the operation were
shown to be necessary to ensure the pregnancy was carried to term.
In In re A.C., decided two months before the Supreme Court recognized the right to
refuse medical treatment, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that a
pregnant woman’s rights were violated by an order compelling a Cesarean surgery. 573
A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). The Cesarean surgery increased the chances of survival for the
twenty-six week fetus but would hasten the mother’s death. See id. at 1239–40. The pa-
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IV. CARHART’S IMPACT ON PREGNANT WOMEN’S RIGHT TO MAKE
TREATMENT CHOICES
A. Introduction
As described above, there are limitations in interpreting abortion
113
jurisprudence in the context of medical treatment refusal cases.
Abortion is generally about a decision to end a pregnancy, as opposed to choosing or refusing treatment options while carrying a

113

tient had refused the Cesarean surgery despite difficulties in communicating while on a
ventilator; however, the judge had indicated that he was uncertain what her intent was.
See id.; George J. Annas, She’s Going to Die: The Case of Angela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
23, 24 (1988) [hereinafter Annas, Angela C.]. Her family had also argued she would not
have consented to the Cesarean surgery. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239–40. The trial
court ordered the procedure; the nonviable fetus died two hours later, and the mother,
now both recovering from major surgery and faced with the knowledge of her child’s
death, died two days later. See Annas, Angela C., at 24.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred, citing the right of every patient to informed consent and the right to refuse medical treatment. See In re A.C., 573
A.2d at 1243–45. The court held that, although courts have “in rare cases” judicially overridden a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment in the interest of protecting fetal
third parties, “a court must determine the patient’s wishes by any means available, and
must abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to
override them.” Id. at 1246–47. The court spoke harshly against overriding a pregnant
woman’s refusal of medical treatment, but did not go so far as to overrule its previous
holding in Madyun. It distinguished Madyun and Jefferson in part because the treatment
ordered in these cases did not conflict with the health interests of the mother. See id. at
1252 n.23. The court also distinguished Madyun as involving a full-term fetus. See id.
In In re Baby Boy Doe, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that a woman cannot be
compelled to undergo a treatment as invasive as a Cesarean surgery, even if her choice
might be harmful to her fetus. 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Physicians testified
that, because of the lack of oxygen the fetus was receiving in the womb, the fetus had almost no chance of surviving the natural child birth the mother had chosen and if he did
survive birth he would be mentally disabled. See id. at 328. In contrast, the child had a
near one-hundred percent chance of surviving a Cesarean surgery. See id. In refusing to
compel treatment, the Baby Boy Doe court explicitly relied upon the health risks to the
mother, as well as the language in Roe and its progeny prohibiting a trade-off between the
woman’s health and the life of the fetus. See id. at 333. The court noted that the Cesarean surgery increased the risks of death for the mother, would be more painful to the
mother, would require additional recuperation, and could lead to additional complications. See id. at 328–29. The court cited Thornburgh for the principle that “the woman’s
health is always the paramount consideration; any degree of increased risk to the woman’s health is unacceptable.” Id. at 333. Because a Cesarean surgery “by its nature,
presents some additional risks to the woman’s health,” particularly when “recommended
solely for the benefit of the fetus,” the court found that “[u]nder Thornburgh, then, it appears that a forced [C]esarean section, undertaken for the benefit of the fetus, cannot
pass constitutional muster.” Id. The court left open, however, the question of whether a
court could order a woman to submit to a less invasive treatment, such as a blood transfusion, that would pose no risks to the mother, which it subsequently refused to do in In re
Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405–06.
See supra Section III.D.
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pregnancy to term. Yet the two bodies of law involve similar rights
and principles. As Stenberg and Carhart demonstrate, abortion jurisprudence is often about a patient’s right to make medical treatment
114
decisions. While this right was subtext in Roe and Casey, it was the
crux of the issue in Stenberg and Carhart. Both Stenberg and Carhart
concerned women’s ability to choose a safer method of abortion procedure rather than whether they could obtain an abortion. What was
at issue in both cases was not the right to choose whether to become
a parent, but rather the right to choose the medical procedure that
115
would give effect to that right.
This section argues that the Carhart decision has implications not
only for abortion jurisprudence but also pregnant women’s right to
refuse medical treatment. Subsection IV.B argues that Carhart’s reasoning encourages more state intervention in the medical treatment
of pregnant women who seek to carry their pregnancy to term by recognizing new or expanded state interests and abridging the primacy
of women’s health. Subsection IV.C discusses these implications in
the context of specific medical treatment choices, such as Cesarean
surgery, the treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women, and fetal
surgery.
B. Applying Carhart to Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Treatment
The Carhart decision may influence cases concerning the medical
treatment of pregnant women in several ways. The decision expands
the state interests that the Court recognizes as justifying intrusion into women’s medical treatment decisions during pregnancy. The majority’s reasoning also implicitly weakens women’s right to informed
consent in the context of medical decisions during pregnancy. Finally, the decision undermines the principle that a woman’s health cannot be compromised to further the state interest in protecting fetal
life.
In the context of a pregnant woman’s right to refuse medical
treatment, Carhart’s expansion of the state’s interest in fetal life expands the justification for states to compel medical treatment. As
discussed above, in medial treatment cases, the state’s interest in fetal
life is not as compelling as in abortion cases: such treatment cases involve risk to the fetus’s life or health, but not the termination of fetal

114
115

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See Hill, supra note 62, at 325 (discussing Carhart I and II in the context of reproductive
choice).
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life at issue in abortion.
Fetal life is implicated far more in these
cases than in Carhart, which concerned the method of abortion rather than whether a fetus would be aborted. Courts may determine
that, if the state’s interest in fetal life justifies state intrusion into
women’s medical decisions in Carhart, it is an even stronger justification for intrusion into the medical treatment decisions in cases where
there is evidence that a fetus may live or die depending on a chosen
course of medical treatment.
Carhart encourages the argument that intervention in these cases
is necessary to further a state interest in demonstrating its respect for
fetal life. Carhart allowed the state to ban a procedure that the majority opinion found morally reprehensible because it undermined respect for fetal life. This reasoning can be translated to other medical
treatment decisions that courts also find abhorrent to the principle of
respect for fetal life. The decision to risk a child’s death during birth,
asphyxiation in utero, a painful and debilitating birth defect, or a
chronic and debilitating disease may logically strike a court as raising
moral issues at least as serious as the choice of an intact D&E over
another method of abortion. The court may also see these decisions
as raising ethical issues for physicians at least equal to the concerns
the Court expressed over a physician’s performance of an intact
D&E. Thus, courts may see Carhart as allowing, or even compelling,
intervention in these cases in order to further the state interest in
117
“promot[ing] respect for life, including life of the unborn.”
Carhart’s interpretation of the state’s interest in protecting the
health of the woman also undermines women’s autonomy in the context of medical decisionmaking during pregnancy. Carhart implies
that, in the context of women’s relationships with the children they
carry, pregnant women cannot be trusted to exercise informed consent. This has enormous implications for medical treatment cases,
where a woman’s exercise of informed consent allows her to choose a
course of treatment that poses increased risks for the fetus’s life or
health. Carhart’s reasoning indicates that the state need not respect
women’s right to informed consent in the context of medical treatment choices during pregnancy because of the regret she might feel
if her decision harms her child.
Indeed, this alleged state interest is arguably implicated even
more in the context of compelled treatment cases than in Carhart.
Carhart involved circumstances in which a woman who has decided to

116
117

See supra Section III.C.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).
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terminate her pregnancy must decide which procedure to use to accomplish those ends. In the context of medical treatment cases, a
woman’s medical treatment decision may result in death or harm to
the fetus she has decided to carry to term. A woman who has decided
to carry her pregnancy to term and is faced with the decision of
whether or not to have a Cesarean surgery to increase the fetus’s
chances of survival may already identify as a mother and have a strong
bond of love with the child she carries. It stands to reason that the
loss of or harm to a child she has decided to carry to term could
cause as much, if not more, regret than the choice of which medical
118
procedure to use during an abortion.
Some scholars argue that while Carhart uses language reflecting
the argument that abortion can be restricted to protect women from
regret, the Court did not adopt this rationale as an independent basis
119
for restricting access to abortion. As Reva Siegel notes, Carhart relied heavily on Casey, which rejected justifications for restricting abor120
tion access that were rooted in gender stereotypes about women.
“Absent dramatic new developments,” Siegel writes, “the constitutionality of a ban based on gender-paternalist justifications for restricting abortion would be determined in a doctrinal framework that pro121
tects women’s autonomy to decide whether to bear a child.”
Restricting abortion based on paternalistic desires to protect women
from the regret they might feel by contradicting their natural roles as
mothers would be “in deep tension” with the very precedent that the
122
Carhart majority relies upon and purports to uphold.
While Carhart uses the language of Casey and its respect for women’s dignity to support its decision, it does so in a way that actually
undermines these goals. Although Carhart does not state that protecting women from their regret is an independent justification for
restricting abortion access, it frames this very justification in the form
of protecting women’s health, which is an independent justification
118

119
120

121
122

It should be noted that many women who have abortions, including those that use the
procedure banned by PBABA, identify as mothers and would prefer to carry their pregnancies to term, yet decide to terminate the pregnancy for reasons including medical necessity. It stands to reason that a medical treatment decision that may cause harm or
death to a fetus the woman intends to carry to term would cause as much potential regret,
if not more, than the choice of which medical procedure to use during an abortion.
See, e.g., Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1705, 1767–73 (discussing the court’s reasoning
for creating the “undue burden” framework).
See, e.g., id. at 1701–02, 1705, 1767–74 (asserting that Roe and Casey symbolize the fact that
“women are able and entitled to decide their own life course, especially in the matters
concerning family roles”).
Id. at 1701.
Id. at 1701–02, 1767–73.
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for restricting abortion that was accepted by Casey as consistent with
respecting women’s autonomy. Carhart reinterprets the women’s
health justification in a way that includes gender-paternalistic assumptions about women’s roles and capabilities, taking a justification
meant to protect women’s dignity and autonomy and reinterpreting
it in a way that undermines these principles. This reasoning, imported into compelled-treatment cases, undercuts women’s ability to
make autonomous medical decisions in the context of refusing
123
treatment when doing so might cause harm or death to the fetus.
Also troubling is Carhart’s repudiation of the principle that there
can be no trade off between the woman’s health and these state interests. Carhart allows the state to pursue these interests by intervening in pregnant women’s medical treatment decisions at the expense
of women’s health if the state can show a modicum of uncertainty
about the effects of the medical treatment on women. In the past,
courts have avoided compelling treatment of pregnant women where
doing so would compromise women’s health, with one court directly
citing Roe for the principle that women’s health may not be sacrificed
124
to further the state interest in fetal life. Indeed, an American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists article published two years
prior to the Carhart decision that considered whether to seek court
intervention when a woman’s refusal to undergo a Cesarean surgery
poses risk to the fetus relied on Stenberg for its conclusion that treatment may not be compelled because doing so would compromise the
125
woman’s health.
Carhart calls this conclusion into doubt. For the first time, the
Court has allowed the state to ban an abortion procedure without any
exception for the life or health of the mother. The majority justifies
this by citing the uncertainty about the need for a health exception
and maintaining that, where there is uncertainty, courts can defer to
123

124
125

Even if Carhart does not designate protecting women from decisions they may regret as an
independent basis for restricting abortion, it need not do so to influence other cases concerning women’s autonomy in medical treatment decisions. In the context of compelled
medical treatment, the Carhart court discussed numerous factors as justifying its conclusion—the interest in fetal life, expressing respect for fetal life, and the regret women may
feel over their decisions. All of these factors may be imported to compelled treatment
cases. The Court’s consideration of the regret women might feel and the need to protect
women from that regret signals that courts may weigh it with these numerous factors and
may allow it to influence their conclusion, even if courts may not rely on it as an independent basis for restricting women’s decisions.
See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
See Richard L. Berkowitz, Should Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Delivery Be a Criminal Offense?,
104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1220, 1220 (2004) (discussing whether a woman should
have the right to refuse a Cesarean delivery).
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the state and err on the side of state interests. The Court’s willingness to rely on slim and questionable evidence to generate uncertainty implies that very little evidence may be needed to override a woman’s health concerns.
One potential way to distinguish Carhart from compelled treatment cases is that while Carhart was a facial challenge to a statute,
compelled treatment cases are more likely to occur on a case-by-case
basis. The Carhart majority justified their refusal to require a health
exception by distinguishing facial and as-applied challenges and stating that a facial challenge required the respondents to demonstrate
that the procedure was medically necessary in a large fraction of cases. It left open the possibility that the statute would not survive an asapplied challenge where a particular woman could demonstrate that
the procedure was medically necessary for her. Compelled treatment
cases will likely not involve a challenge to a statute, but rather casespecific determinations that more closely resemble as-applied challenges.
While this is a valid distinction that prevents Carhart from fitting
neatly into the framework of compelled medical treatment cases outlined above, Carhart still provides troubling precedent for compelled
treatment cases by eroding the primacy of women’s health. Past Supreme Court cases made no distinction between the unqualified need
for a health exception in facial challenges as opposed to as-applied
challenges because there was no reason to distinguish these two types
of cases. As the dissent argues, the health exception is required to
protect the exceptional cases and underscore the fact that in no circumstance may women’s health be undermined to protect fetal life.
The majority, on the contrary, provides a holding that will require
women to undergo less safe procedures in numerous circumstances.
The majority argued that it could not find that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because the respondents did not demonstrate that the procedure was medically necessary in “a large fraction”
126
of cases. This implies that the majority willingly accepted a ban on
a procedure that is medically necessary in a small fraction of the cases. Perhaps more important, the majority’s deference to Congress in
the face of medical uncertainty also means that, regardless of the
fraction of cases in which the procedure may be medically necessary,
any uncertainty allows the procedure to be banned. If any lack of
126

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (arguing that the court in Carhart “upheld
an abortion restriction without knowing whether necessary abortions would in fact be
barred”).
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certainty requires complete deference to Congress, then a ban that
might prohibit a medically necessary abortion in seventy-five percent
of cases would survive constitutional scrutiny as easily as a ban that
might prohibit a medically necessary abortion in twenty-five percent
127
of cases.
Thus, Carhart allows an intrusion into the medical treatment decisions of women that it implicitly acknowledges will result in
compromising women’s health.
Carhart’s erosion of the primacy of women’s health is not necessarily limited to facial challenges. Carhart allows manufactured uncertainty to undermine the principle that there can be no circumstance
in which women’s health can be undermined to further state interests
in fetal life (and, in the case of Carhart, other dubious state interests).
There is no logical reason to hold that uncertainty can undermine
this principle in facial challenges as opposed to as-applied challenges.
If uncertainty can compromise the primacy of women’s health in facial challenges, why can it not be used to compromise women’s
health in as-applied challenges or in the case of specific women seeking to avoid unwanted medical treatment?
This facial/as-applied distinction does not apply to the expanded
state interests described above, which the state could assert in an asapplied challenge or a compelled medical treatment case. Thus, the
Carhart majority’s argument that a state may limit a pregnant woman’s medical options in order to promote an interest in fetal life applies in the context of any state action; the state could raise this justification in a facial challenge to a statute, an as-applied challenge to a
statute, or an order compelling the treatment of a specific woman.
Similarly, Carhart’s argument that the state may further its interest in
women’s health by limiting their ability to choose medical procedures
they may regret also applies in the context of any state intrusion,
whether by statute or through an order compelling treatment.
In sum, the principles set forth in Carhart allow states to compel
medical treatment in more and more cases, relying on dubious state
interests. Carhart undermines the principle that these interests may
not be pursued at the expense of maternal health. As the following
section sets forth, this reasoning supports compelled medical treatment in a variety of contexts in which courts have heretofore been
less likely to accept.

127

Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 270 (considering the implications of a health exception
for allowing abortions under certain conditions of risk).

182

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:1

C. The Impact of Carhart’s Reasoning on Specific Treatment Choices
1. Surgical Interventions
The overwhelming majority of Cesarean surgeries are performed
for the benefit of the fetus and do not provide any medical benefit to
128
the pregnant woman.
While Cesarean surgery has become a very
common procedure, with rates increasing from 5% in the 1970s to
129
31.1% in 2006, it is an invasive medical procedure for a woman, involving major abdominal surgery. During the procedure, the patient
is anesthetized, an incision is made into her abdominal wall and uterus, and various connective tissue are retracted so that the surgeon
130
The
can reach in and remove the fetus through the incision.
surgeon then extracts the placenta and amniotic membranes from
the uterine wall, sutures the uterus, and closes the several layers of
131
the abdominal wall.
Approximately ten percent of patients will
132
hemorrhage excessively, requiring a blood transfusion. Afterwards,
if the patient received spinal anesthesia, she must remain supine for
eight hours. She cannot eat for eight hours following the procedure
and may have to take antibiotics to reduce the chance of infection.
Cesarean surgery involves a significantly longer recovery time than
vaginal birth.
Cesarean surgery also involves additional risks for the mother.
The risk to a pregnant woman’s life is four to five times greater than
133
vaginal deliveries and “maternal morbidity is more frequent and

128

129

130
131
132
133

See Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (stating that many women undergo Cesarean sections “for the express purpose of benefiting their fetuses”); see also Telephone Interview
with Howard Minkoff, Chairman, Dep’t of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Maimonides
Hosp., (June 25, 2009). Common indications for Cesarean surgery are “dystocia, fetal
distress, repeat cesarean delivery, and breech or malpresentation.” Levine, supra note 80,
at 238 (listing the risks that women who receive Cesarean sections encounter).
See Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REP. 1
(2009) (noting that this percentage is an all time high for Cesarean deliveries); see also
Levine, supra note 80, at 235 (placing the rate for a Cesarean section at over 20%). This
drastic increase has been the cause of considerable controversy, as some argue that the
increase is due not merely to improvements in medical technology, but also convenience,
economics, and fear of malpractice suits. See Levine, supra note 80, at 236; see also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 50 n.210.
See Levine, supra note 80, at 237 (discussing the procedure for a Cesarean surgery).
See id.
See id.
See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 66–67 (asserting that despite the improvements in technology, the risk of maternal fatality with a Cesarean delivery remains higher than the risk
posed by a vaginal delivery); Levine, supra note 80, at 238 (citing the potential harm that
could result to the mother from a Cesarean surgery).
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134

likely to be more severe.” Short-term risks involve reactions to anes135
Longthesia, excessive blood loss, bladder injury, and infection.
term risks involve uterine rupture in subsequent labor and the need
136
for Cesarean surgery in subsequent pregnancies.
Carhart’s reasoning changes the analysis in the overwhelming majority of Cesarean surgeries that are performed for the benefit of the
fetus and without benefit to the mother. While Cesarean surgeries in
general clearly pose additional risks to the mother, it is not difficult
to imagine the use of a single study demonstrating that risks were minimal in order to inject “uncertainty” into the court’s mind, just as
questionable medical evidence was used to create uncertainty among
the Carhart majority about whether a health exception was necessary
137
for PBABA. While in the past the Court had ruled that uncertainty
required courts to err on the side of the mother’s health, courts may
feel free to err on the side of allowing state interest in the shadow of
Carhart.
This same reasoning can be expanded to compel medical treatment in the context of fetal surgery. Like the majority of Cesarean
surgeries, fetal surgery is surgery that is performed to address fetal
health issues, rather than maternal health issues. During fetal surgery, the surgeon makes an incision into the abdomen and uterus,
similar to a Cesarean surgery, and exposes the fetus so that the fetus
138
is partially outside the womb.
While fetal surgery is still relatively
experimental, it has been established that fetal surgery can provide
“unequivocal, life-saving benefit” with regard to at least two congenit139
al anomalies. Risks of fetal surgery are infection of the incision or
lining of the uterus, uterine rupture, premature labor and delivery,

134
135
136
137

138

139

Levine, supra note 80, at 238.
See id. at 239 (noting the short term risks of Cesarean delivery).
See id. (discussing the long term risks of Cesarean delivery).
For example, some studies suggest that elective, scheduled Cesarean surgeries might actually improve maternal health outcomes. See, e.g., Howard Minkoff & Frank Chervenak,
Elective Primary Cesarean Delivery, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 946, 946 (2003). While these studies may not apply to the circumstances of a compelled treatment case, they merely demonstrate how selective interpretation of studies can be used to create uncertainty about a
particular medical treatment.
See Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans: Why the Constitution is Not Silent on
Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 184 (2009) (stating the procedure for fetal surgery where the unborn child is medically treated in the womb).
See Michael W. Bebbington et al., Open Fetal Surgery, in PRENATAL MEDICINE 493, 497
(John M.G. van Vugt & Lee P. Schulman eds., 2006) (stating that open fetal intervention
benefits CCAM (cystic adenomatoid malformation) and SCT (sacrococcygeal teratoma));
see also Nelson, supra note 138, at 184 (suggesting the benefits of open fetal surgery for
particular life threatening congenital anomalies).
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bleeding, leakage of amniotic fluid, and complications associated
140
with anesthesia.
Similarly, Carhart’s reasoning supports increased intervention in
the context of cerclage, a suturing of the cervix that is used to prevent premature labor where a woman’s cervix is weak. Cerclage is only likely to be successful where a cervix has been properly diagnosed
as incompetent, a diagnosis that is very difficult to make and can of141
ten be inaccurate. Risks include reaction to anesthesia, cervical infection, cervical laceration, rupture of membranes, premature contractions, and the inability of the cervix to dilate normally in the
142
course of labor.
While the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned the performance of a cerclage in Taft v. Taft, the court relied
in part on the lack of evidence that the cerclage was necessary and
143
the lack of information provided about the risks it posed. Carhart’s
reasoning expands state interests beyond the need to save fetal lives,
arguably making the necessity of the operation less critical in a compelled treatment case. More importantly, Carhart’s erosion of the
primacy of maternal health also makes the risks posed by the procedure less dispositive where evidence can be presented that those risks
are uncertain.
2. Treatment of Pregnant HIV-Positive Women
The medical treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women provides
an example of a chronic medical condition that may generate tension
between physicians’ recommendations and pregnant women’s treat-

140
141

142
143

See Bebbington et al., supra note 139, at 506 (examining the maternal risks of open maternal-fetal surgery).
See, e.g., R.W. Rush et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Cervical Cerclage in Women at High
Risk of Spontaneous Preterm Delivery, 91 BRIT. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 724, 728
(2005) (discussing the variances and difficulties in making a diagnosis of “cervical incompetence”); Catrin Tudur-Smith et al., Individual Patient Data Meta-Analysis: Cervical Stitch
(Cerclage) for Preventing Pregnancy Loss in Women, 5 BMC PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 5, 5
(2005) (“Several observational studies into the efficacy of cervical cerclage have claimed
high rates of successful pregnancy outcome in women with a poor obstetric history attributed to cervical incompetence . . . . Current data suggests that cervical cerclage is likely
to benefit women considered to be “at very high risk” of a second trimester miscarriage
due to a cervical factor, however identifying such women remains elusive . . . .).
See Rush et al., supra note 141, at 728–29 (noting the deleterious effects of cerclage on
some women).
See 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983) (The record is devoid of facts that support the
judgment ordering the wife to submit to an operation against her consent. We have no
findings . . . describing the operative procedure, stating the nature of any risks to the
wife . . . or setting forth whether the operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary . . . .).
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ment choices. HIV may be transmitted in utero and during childbirth. While all infants born to mothers living with HIV will test positive for HIV antibodies, this does not necessarily mean these infants
will develop HIV. Without medical intervention, the rate of transmis144
sion during pregnancy and birth is approximately 25.5%. Prophylactic measures such as antiretroviral therapy (“ARV” therapy) and
Cesarean surgery prior to the rupture of membranes reduce the pe145
rinatal transmission rate still further, to less than 2%.
While they are extremely effective at preventing mother-to-child
transmission, ARVs and Cesarean surgery have numerous risks and
side effects. The side effects of ARV therapy range from unpleasant
to life-threatening, including the following: nausea; vomiting; diarrhea; a painful and potentially debilitating condition called neuropathy that causes pain in the hands and feet; impaired functioning of
vital organs such as the liver and the kidneys; bone marrow suppression; damage to the reproductive system; and increased risk of heart
146
disease. Patients taking ARVs may also develop resistance to them,
which could reduce a woman’s treatment options when ARV therapy
147
is needed for her own health. Pregnant women who take ARVs for
the sake of preventing transmission when their own health does not
require ARV therapy may therefore shorten their own life as a result.

144

145

146

147

Joseph P. McGowan & Sanjiv S. Shah, Prevention of Perinatal HIV Transmission During Pregnancy, 46 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 657, 658 (2000) (finding that perinatal HIV
transmission was about 25.5% in a placebo group of pregnant women).
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in
Public Health: Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HIV Infection—United States, 1985–2005,
55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 592, 592 (2006) (“[R]eduction is attributed to
routine HIV screening of pregnant women, use of antiretroviral . . . drugs . . . avoidance
of breastfeeding, and use of elective [C]esarean delivery . . . . With these interventions,
rates of HIV transmission during pregnancy, labor, or delivery from mothers infected
with HIV have been reduced to less than 2% . . . .”).
See Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument Against Mandatory AZT
Treatment of HIV-Positive Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (1997) (“There
are significant side effects to taking AZT. Among these are bone marrow suppression,
malaise, nausea, headaches, and occasional seizures.”); see also Kimberley M. Mutcherson,
No Way to Treat a Woman: Creating an Appropriate Standard for Resolving Medical Treatment
Disputes Involving HIV-Positive Children, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 230–31 (2002) (discussing the “significant drug side effects” that “range from annoying to aesthetically unpleasing to life-threatening”).
See Halem, supra note 146, at 501–02 (“[O]ne potential concern of pregnant women is
the risk of developing an immunity to AZT, thus decreasing their long-term chance of
survival.”); Mutcherson, supra note 146, at 231 (“A patient may derive benefits from beginning [ARV treatment] while her immune system is relatively strong, but she may later
find that she has developed resistance to drugs that she needs more desperately as her
disease progresses.”).
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Cesarean surgeries come with increased risks to the mother, and
148
these risks may be magnified for women living with HIV.
Prior to Carhart, courts had little legal justification to mandate
ARVs or a Cesarean surgery over the objection of an HIV-positive
pregnant woman in order to reduce risks of transmission. While Roe
recognized a state interest in protecting fetal life, transmission of HIV
is not equivalent to death; what is at issue is not death or even risk of
death, but rather risk of the transmission of a serious, chronic disease. Roe and subsequent cases made clear that treatment could not
be compelled where doing so would harm the health of the mother.
Compelled treatment would therefore be prohibited in the cases
where ARVs could cause debilitating side effects or cause a woman to
build up resistance prematurely. This reasoning would also prevent
courts from compelling Cesarean surgeries to prevent mother-tochild transmission.
Carhart’s reasoning can easily be interpreted to shift the balance
of state interests and empower the state to mandate treatment.
Courts may use Carhart’s purported state interests in promoting respect for the fetus and preventing pregnant women from making
medical decisions they might regret to justify mandating treatment
that will reduce the likelihood that a pregnant woman will transmit
HIV to her fetus. Given the large degree of uncertainty about the effects ARVs may have on any given individual, courts may decide to err
on the side of compelling treatment under Carhart; for the reasons
stated in the previous subsection, courts may reach the same conclu149
sion with regard to Cesarean surgeries.
3. Other Medical Decisions
In the context of fetal therapy, numerous additional medical decisions can be the source of state intervention, such as treatment for
gestational diabetes, fetal drug therapies to prevent premature labor,
and even the requirement that women undertake significant dietary
changes where, in rare circumstances, diet might otherwise lead to
148

149

See Amana, supra note 77, at 60 (“[S]ome data indicate that the risk of complications
[from c-sections] in HIV positive women may be higher than in negative women. . . . [C]esarean delivery . . . is associated with significant morbidity in infected women.”).
While ARV therapy is a long-term treatment plan, rather than a single procedure, courts
could order women to undergo treatment and report regularly to ensure their adherence
much in the same way courts order and monitor drug rehabilitation. Doing so would
force women not only to undergo invasive drug therapy and endure its side effects, but
also to undergo constant monitoring to ensure compliance.
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150

severe birth defects.
As new fetal therapy techniques are discovered, more occasions for intervening in the medical decisions of
pregnant women are likely to arise.
In addition to fetal therapy decisions, more indirect treatment decisions may also raise the ire of the state. For example, physicians
and courts may view the decision to undergo a home birth as unacceptably risky to the fetus, particularly in a high-risk pregnancy. In
Pemberton, the court ordered a woman attempting a home birth to return to a hospital and submit to surgical intervention against her
151
will. Similarly, failure to undertake bed rest can, in some cases, lead
152
Indeed, in a recent unreto premature labor and fetal demise.
ported decision, a Florida county court ordered, at the state’s request, that a woman in her twenty-fifth week of pregnancy remain
hospitalized and confined to bed rest and submit to any treatment,
including Cesarean surgery, that her physicians deemed necessary “to
153
preserve the life and health of [her] unborn child.”
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF
PREGNANT WOMEN
A. Doctrinal Implications: Women as a “Special Class of Persons”
1. Introduction
Expanding state power to compel treatment of pregnant women
has significant constitutional law implications. Specifically, compelled treatment infringes on both constitutional liberty and equality
guarantees by designating pregnant women as a special class of indi150

151

152
153

See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (discussing the many voluntary procedures
pregnant women undergo for the health of their babies); John A. Robertson & Joseph D.
Schulman, Pregnancy and Prenatal Harm to Offspring: The Case of Mothers with PKU, 17
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 23 (1987) (“The need for public policies to prevent avoidable
prenatal injuries has arisen in several different contexts: prenatal medical or surgical
treatment and [C]esarean section; prenatal abuse of alcohol, heroin, and cocaine; exclusion from workplaces posing prenatal hazards to offspring; and prenatal transmission of
herpes and syphilis.”).
See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249–50 (N.D.
Fla. 1999) (holding that the order compelling the pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section against her will did not violate the woman’s substantive constitutional rights
and granting summary judgment to the hospital).
See Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (noting that pregnant women may undertake bed
rest for preterm contractions).
In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, No. 2009 CA 1167 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2009);
see Brief of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Burton v. Florida (No.
ID09-1958) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2009). The case is currently pending appeal.
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viduals with limited autonomy. The troubling nature of compelled
medical treatment can be seen most clearly and addressed most effectively by an approach that recognizes the intertwined nature of its liberty and equality implications.
2. Compelled Treatment’s Implications for Women’s Liberty
Compelling medical treatment of pregnant women deprives women of their right to bodily autonomy. While many may argue that a
woman who decides to carry her pregnancy to term assumes a moral
154
duty to her fetus, the law does not impose every moral duty as a le155
gal duty. For example, a parent cannot be legally required to pro156
While a
vide a life-saving bone marrow transplant for her child.
parent may have a moral obligation to undergo the medical treatment, courts may not compel it because doing so would infringe on
the parent’s right to refuse medical treatment.
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women excludes pregnant women from the standard medical model of counseling and in157
formed consent.
This cannot be justified by the state’s interest in
154

155

156

157

See, e.g., Robertson & Schulman, supra note 150, at 24–25 (arguing that women who decide to carry a child to term assume moral obligations to undergo medical treatment to
ensure the child’s health); see also Merrick, supra note 100, at 68–69 (“[I]t is morally irresponsible to voluntarily bring an infant into the world but refuse to make reasonable efforts to allow that child to be born healthy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Grizzi, supra note 77, at 498 (observing that establishing a duty of a mother to her fetus in certain contexts could only be grounded on “a pronounced extension of duty principles in prior case law”).
See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 28–29 (noting that no parent has ever been forced to undergo surgery to save the life of a child); Amana, supra note 77, at 56 (“[A] mother is not
legally required to donate a kidney if her child needs it; nor would an identical twin be
forced to donate bone marrow to a sibling in need.”); Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note
101, at 17 (“No mother has ever been legally required to undergo . . . bone marrow . . . transplant[] to save the life of her dying child.”); Howard Minkoff & Lynn M. Paltrow, Melissa Rowland and the Rights of Pregnant Women, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1234, 1235 (2004) (observing that courts have ruled that relatives cannot be compelled to
submit to bone marrow transplants); cf. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90–92
(1978) (holding that a terminally ill patient has no right to require a relative to submit to
a life-saving transplant).
See Goldberg, supra note 72, at 620 (“Requiring women to undergo unwanted treatment
for the sake of their fetuses would deprive women of the liberty of choosing a course of action, which choice is the crux of the informed consent decision.”); Rothman, supra note
104, at 25 (“Competent adults in this society have the right to refuse medical treatment,
even when it is believed to be life-saving.”); see also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 57–58
(“Until a child is brought forth from the woman’s body, our relationship with it must be
mediated by her.”); cf. Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note 77, at 27
(arguing that the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, which requires physicians to provide
women seeking abortions with scientifically questionable information about the pain a fetus might feel during the abortion “makes women and abortion providers a unique class,
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fetal life, much less by the more amorphous and questionable interest
in expressing respect for fetal life identified in Carhart. Society’s interest in fetal life may be deep-rooted and profound, but, as Sylvia
Law has noted, “the sustenance the fetus needs is not society’s to give.
158
It can only be provided by a particular pregnant woman.” Forcing a
woman to undergo a medical treatment to further societal interests
allows the state to determine for a woman what risks she must assume
for the benefit of the fetus and physically appropriates her body to
159
serve the state’s interest in the fetus.
Such appropriation is so abhorrent to the concept of individual liberty protected by the Constitution that courts have denied the state’s ability to demand similar sacrifices in the context of saving the lives of third parties or furthering
160
a criminal investigation.
Carhart gives credence to an additional justification for compelled
medical treatment that has gained popularity among anti-choice advocates in recent years: namely, that curtailing women’s autonomy in
this way benefits women and is necessary to protect their health and
161
This justification posits that a woman will come to rewell-being.
gret a decision she makes before birth that results in harm to the
child she carries and that this profound regret will cause her physical
and psychological harm; denying her this choice is therefore neces162
sary to protect her health.
Such reasoning curtails women’s liberty by assuming, and reinforcing, that pregnant women have limited agency. Some proponents of the women-protective rationale argue that a woman cannot

158
159

160

161

162

excluded from the standard medical model in which counseling is provided by a physician who uses professional judgment to determine what a reasonable individual would
need in order to make an informed choice about a procedure”).
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1027 (1984).
See Gallagher, supra note 76, at 42 (“[F]etal rights may be predicated upon a new set of
parental duties . . . . [T]he state is virtually required to appropriate the woman’s body and
life to the affirmative service of the fetus. The pregnant woman, no longer treated as the
virtual chattel of her husband, instead becomes the subject of the state . . . .”).
See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the state cannot compel surgery in order to obtain evidence of a crime without compelling circumstances); McFall, 10
Pa. D. & C.3d at 91–92 (refusing to compel a bone marrow transplant to save the life of
the potential donor’s cousin).
For detailed discussions of the women-protective argument, see Siegel, New Politics, supra
note 59, at 992–93 (outlining the spread and use of the woman-protective antiabortion
argument); Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1641(discussing the woman-protective
rationale for restricting abortion). See generally Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the rationale of the majority in Carhart).
See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1006–29 (discussing the rationale of South Dakota’s abortion ban); Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1651–56 (providing examples of
the women-protective argument in the campaign to ban abortion in South Dakota).
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exercise informed consent in a manner that causes harm to the child
she carries because it goes against her very nature; thus such decisions must have been the result of coercion, duress, lack of information, or some other interference with the proper exercise of in163
formed consent.
The women-protective argument accepted in
Carhart deprives her of this decision while simultaneously arguing
that it is protecting her right to informed consent; it makes the decision she would have made had she been truly exercising informed
164
consent.
It presumes that women are incapable of making informed decisions about their pregnancy that contradict what the state
165
has presumed to be their nature; thus, the state must make these
decisions for them.
While all such infringements on women’s autonomy are troub166
ling, they are particularly so where the state’s decision may come at
163

164

165

166

See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1008–10 (noting that supporters of womanprotective abortion restrictions suggest “that no matter what a clinic tells a [pregnant]
client or however great [the client’s] expertise, the abortion procedure inherently lacks
consent because a pregnant woman cannot make a truly informed decision to give up a
relationship with a child until after the child is born”).
See id. (“[W]omen making a decision to abort a pregnancy cannot knowingly consent to
the procedure unless they are in the position of women making a decision to give up a
child for adoption, and have the opportunity to reconsider their decision after the child’s
birth.”).
See Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1674–75 (observing that the “pro-woman” strategy rests on the idea that “[t]he best interests of the child and the mother are always
joined—even if the mother does not initially realize it, and even if she needs a tremendous amount of love and help to see it”); see also Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, Gonzales v. Carhart: How the Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act Affects Women’s Constitutional Liberty and Equality, FINDLAW (May 7, 2007),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070507_mcclain.html (noting Carhart’s focus on “protecting women from ill-considered decisions” and the psychologically harmful
effects of the decision to abort). Overriding a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical
treatment compels her to conform to what the state defines as her proper role as a mother: to nurture and protect the fetus she carries as best she can. See Ian Vandewalker,
Note, Taking the Baby Before It’s Born: Termination of the Parental Rights of Women Who Use Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 423, 429–32 (2008) (arguing
that patriarchal views define motherhood as a woman’s most important role, and “misconduct during pregnancy is taken as proof that the woman fails the model of the ideal
mother”); cf. Johnson, supra note 88, at 612 (“If the state were to deprive women of their
right to choose to have an abortion, it would impose on women a duty to bear unwanted
children; by creating fetal rights susceptible to use against pregnant women, the state
compels women who desire to bear children to reorganize their lives in accordance with
judicially-defined norms of behavior.”). This is also in stark contrast to the language of
Casey, which warns against the state imposing its moral views on the roles of mothers. See
infra note 207 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the health exception itself highlights the value judgments courts have made
about women’s roles as potential mothers. As Reva Siegel argues, “more than any sexbased legislation the Court has reviewed in the modern era, the therapeutic exception [to
abortion regulation] graphically defines women as childbearers” because, by allowing the
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the expense of the pregnant woman’s health. In these circumstances,
the state requires a woman not only to sacrifice her autonomy, but also her well-being. She must subordinate her medical needs to the
whim of the state and, in some situations, literally allow herself to be
cut into, sutured, or injected with medication causing debilitating
side effects. She must risk complications, short-term and long-term
side effects, and even death. In one case, the court’s decision to
compel treatment actually hastened a woman’s death before a higher
167
court overturned it. Carhart potentially expands the state’s license
to devalue and infringe upon women’s autonomy by allowing the
state to subordinate women’s autonomy to the state’s interests—not
only in fetal life but also in merely expressing respect for fetal life—
even where women’s health is compromised.
3. Compelled Treatment’s Implications for Women’s Equality
This infringement on autonomy and the underlying assumptions
used to justify it also have significant constitutional implications for
women’s equality. Compelled treatment cases, like abortion cases,
concern burdens that only women must bear, and assumptions about
their unique role in society as child bearers. Compelling women to
undergo treatment for the sake of the fetus sets them apart as a separate class of individuals with limited autonomy rights. This “unique
class” view is perhaps best illustrated by Judge Belson’s dissenting
168
opinion in In re A.C.
In A.C., the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that a compelled Cesarean surgery that hastened a

167

168

state to regulate abortion except where doing so would threaten the life or health of the
mother, the state defines the pregnant women’s liberty interest in abortion as merely one
of “brute physical survival” and ignores many of the social, intellectual, or emotional
stakes women may have in avoiding becoming parents. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 365 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning]. In the context of compelled medical treatment, some court’s willingness to compel treatment based on the intrusiveness of the treatment or the harm it might do the mother reflects this reasoning
and demonstrates a lack of willingness to consider seriously a woman’s interests in controlling her bodily autonomy unless she can demonstrate sufficient physical harm will result from compelled treatment.
See In re A.C, 533 A.2d 611, 613–15, 617 (D.C. 1987) (“[The Court] well know[s] that we
may have shortened [the pregnant mother’s] life span by a few hours.”), vacated 573 A.2d
1235 (D.C. 1990); Annas, Angela C, supra note 112, at 24 (“Mrs. C., now confronted with
both recovery from [a Cesarean section] and the knowledge of her child’s death, died
approximately two days [after the court-ordered Cesarean section].”).
573 A.2d 1235, 1253–56 (1990) (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Dissenting in part, Judge Belson

[A]woman who carries a child to viability is in fact a member of a unique
category of persons. Her circumstances differ fundamentally from those
of other potential patients for medical procedures that will aid another
person, for example, a potential donor of bone marrow for transplant.
This is so because she has undertaken to bear another human being, and
has carried an unborn child to viability. . . . [T]he expectant mother has
placed herself in a special class of persons who are bringing another person into existence, and upon whom that other person’s life is totally de170
pendent.

What Judge Belson refers to as a “special class” is, in reality,
171
second-class citizenship that is unique to women. The state, acting
on behalf of the fetus or the alleged interests of the woman herself,
restricts a woman’s ability to control her body in a context that is par172
ticular to women: childbearing.
While not all women can or will
become pregnant, women are unique in their capacity to become
pregnant and give birth. This uniqueness comes with significant
burdens both biological—such as burdens on a woman’s health and
mobility—and constructed by society—such as burdens on a woman’s
173
independence and ability to earn income. Thus, reproductive decisions concern both women’s autonomy and their ability to participate

169
170
171

172

173

See id. at 1253.
See id. at 1256.
See Mackenzie et al., supra note 104, at 25 (mandating medical treatment of pregnant
women for the benefit of the fetus raises the “danger of creating of pregnant women a
second class of citizen, without basic legal rights of bodily integrity and selfdetermination”).
See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 76, at 43 (noting that the “fetal rights theory” would support making a woman subordinate from the early stages of pregnancy); Law, supra note
158, at 955–56 (“[A]lthough men may be disadvantaged by their relatively minor role in
reproduction, we have constructed a society in which men are advantaged, relative to
women, in important material and spiritual ways.”); Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 166, at
269 (“[T]he capacity to gestate distinguishes the sexes socially: Judgments about women’s
capacity to bear children play a key role in social definitions of gender roles and thus in
the social logic of ‘discrimination based on gender as such.’”).
See Law, supra note 158, at 956 (“Pregnancy and childbirth are . . . burdensome to health,
mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself . . . .”); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56
EMORY L.J. 815, 817–20 (2007) [hereinafter Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments] (outlining arguments of a “sex equality” approach to reproductive rights, which gives “attention to the
social as well as physical aspects of reproductive relations”); see also Siegel, Reasoning, supra
note 166, at 274 (noting that “[b]ecause Roe and its progeny treat pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to which the community that would regulate a
woman’s reproductive choices is in fact implicated in them, responsible for defining motherhood in ways that impose material deprivations and dignitary injuries on those who
perform its work”).
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174

as full members of society equal to men.
Compelling medical
treatment of women curtails this significantly by designating women
as a class of citizens with limited abilities to make decisions that impact both their own bodies and their place in society.
The designation of women as a special class of citizens because of
their reproductive capacity is rooted in and reinforces traditional stereotypes about women’s social roles and capacities. Early Supreme
Court cases, written before modern equal protection jurisprudence,
contain paternalistic language affirming the state’s right to regulate
women’s roles in society because of their ability to have children. In
Bradwell v. State, an 1873 case in which the Supreme Court upheld a
statute prohibiting women from becoming members of the bar, Justice Bradley justified the statute on the grounds that “[t]he natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
175
benign offices of wife and mother.” In 1908, the Court upheld legislation limiting the number of hours women could work, in part because “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and
176
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women continues this
177
reasoning by reinforcing women’s traditional role as nurturers and
174

175
176

177

See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 383 (1985) (“Also in the balance [when discussing abortion
rights] is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course . . . her ability to stand in
relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”);
Law, supra note 158, at 956 (“Pregnancy and childbirth are also burdensome to health,
mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself, and women are profoundly disadvantaged in that they alone bear these burdens.”).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). Muller was decided only a few years after the
Supreme Court struck down protective labor legislation that applied to male workers, arguing that “limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn
their living” failed to recognize men’s constitutional right to freedom of contract. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61–62 (1905); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them From
Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1464, 1502–03 (2009) (comparing Lochner and Muller in the context of womenprotective labor laws).
While this article focuses on the decisions of competent pregnant women in the context
of medical treatment, the state has limited the autonomy of pregnant women based on
their pregnancy in numerous other contexts. For example, two-thirds of states either explicitly do not recognize or make it more difficult to enforce an advance directive if the
patient is pregnant. Daniel Sperling, Do Pregnant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 333–34 (2005) (discussing regulation of pregnancy clauses
throughout the United States). Many states also provide harsher penalties for drug use
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caregivers, whose first priority must be the well-being of others, particularly their children. Tellingly, courts do not intervene where a
mother is seeking to undergo surgery that might compromise her
health for the sake of the fetus, even though ostensibly the state has a
vested interest in preserving the health and life of the woman in
those circumstances just as it has an interest in preserving fetal life.
Women’s decisions in these situations, however, are not questioned
because such a decision comports with stereotypes about women’s
roles as mothers and their natural inclination to protect their children. The women-protective argument embraced in Carhart makes
this rationale explicit, referencing the bond of love women are presumed to feel for their children as a unique part of women’s nature,
178
and using this to justify imposing restrictions on their autonomy.
Such arguments presume women are “impaired in their capacity to
make life plans to the extent that their life decisions deviate from role
179
expectations concerning women’s obligations as mothers.”
Modern Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence rejects
traditional notions of women’s roles as a basis for state action. While
historically federal and state law often discriminated against women
and justified such discrimination with traditional notions of differentiated family roles, this reasoning was rejected in a line of cases beginning in the 1970s which redefined sex discrimination jurisprudence and rejected sex-based state action premised on traditional sex
180
roles.
Such state action was rejected even where such actions pur-

178

179
180

during pregnancy. See generally, Vandewalker, supra note 165, at 423 (noting that several
states have “made the use of illegal drugs while pregnant a ground for terminating a
mother’s parental rights).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child. The [Partial Birth
Abortion] Act recognizes this reality as well.”); see also Grossman & McClain, supra note
165 (“[I]n Carhart, Justice Kennedy . . . describes abortion as a ‘difficult and a painful
moral decision’ and declares that the [Partial Birth Abortion Act] recognizes the ‘reality’
that ‘respect for life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for
her child.’”); Hasday, supra note 176, at 1485–86 (“In Carhart . . . the argument that antiabortion laws protect women from regret has two central premises. The first premise was
that women’s fundamental nature was maternal.”); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1792.
Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1036.
In Reed v. Reed, the Court struck down a law in which men were preferred to women for
estate administration purposes. 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated, the [law] violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). Since Reed, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down sex-based
classifications justified by traditional stereotypes about women’s roles as caretakers and
men’s roles as breadwinners. See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995 (“In a series of
equal protection cases . . . in the 1970s, the Court struck down sex-based laws premised
on the male breadwinner/female caregiver model.”). The Court held that military fringe
benefits, social security benefits, welfare assistance, and workers’ compensation all must
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181

portedly protect women; in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
for example, the Court held that a policy of excluding males from a
state nursing school violated the equal protection clause, stating that:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is
to exclude or “protect” members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the
182
objective itself is illegitimate.

Despite this strong language, the Court has tailored equal protection jurisprudence to provide little protection against state actions
that enforce these stereotypes in the realm of reproduction and
pregnancy. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld a state operated

181

182

be guaranteed to women to the same extent they are guaranteed to men. See Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (striking down Missouri workers’ compensation laws); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (finding the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act unconstitutional because it provided benefits only when the father
becomes unemployed); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding that the Social Security Act’s survivors’ benefits section was unconstitutional because it awarded female workers’ spouses less protection than male workers’ spouses); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating a gender-based distinction mandated by a
section of the Social Security Act); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (concluding that sections of a statute awarding military fringe benefits violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Also offensive to the notion of sex equality was
a Louisiana law that designated the husband as the head of the household with the unilateral right to dispose of jointly owned property. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,
456 (1981) (concluding that the Louisiana statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Gender and the United States Constitution:
Equal Protection, Privacy, and Federalism, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 306, 314–18 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005) [hereinafter Siegel, Gender and the Constitution] (“Modern equal protection law thus views sex distinctions in public law as presumptively unconstitutional. In numerous cases . . . the
Court has invalidated a variety of laws that drew distinctions on the basis of sex.”); see also
Ginsburg, supra note 174, at 377–80 (outlining the 1970s gender discrimination cases).
See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995–96 (“The Court has also emphasized that the
Constitution’s prohibition on laws enforcing gender-differentiated family roles extends to
laws that purport to protect women.”). Striking down an alimony statute that allocated
benefits differently based on sex, the Court rejected the state’s ability to make laws with
the objective of enforcing a family model “under which the wife plays a dependent role”
and held that:
[T]he old notion that generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide a
home and its essentials, can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. . . .
....
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of
gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the proper
place of women and their need for special protection.
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80, 283 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); see also Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995–96
(“Since . . . 1971 . . . the Court has never sustained laws having the objective or purpose of
preserving or perpetuating gender-differentiated family roles.”).
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disability income protection plan that excluded pregnancy, holding
that in the context of equal protection, discrimination that is based
on biological differences is not sex-based discrimination because the
183
sexes are not “similarly situated” in that context.
The Court reasoned that pregnancy discrimination does not involve “gender as
such,” but rather “an objectively identifiable physical condition with
184
unique characteristics.”
The Court distinguished pregnancy discrimination from sex-based discrimination on the grounds that, while
all pregnant persons are female, the non-pregnant classification con185
tains both males and females. Pregnancy-based classifications were
therefore shielded from the heightened equal protection scrutiny reserved for sex-based classifications “[a]bsent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the
186
other.”
The Court continued this line of reasoning throughout the 1980s,
repeatedly upholding reproductive-based distinctions between men
and women on the ground that the sexes are not similarly situated
with regard to their ability to become pregnant. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, the Court upheld a statutory rape law that penalized only
183

184
185

186

417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974) (“Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.”); see also Developments in the Law—Medical Technology
and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1581–82 (1990) [hereinafter Developments in Law—
Medical Technology] (“The Supreme Court . . . has been skeptical of gender discrimination
claims based on pregnancy. Because the Court tends to see the disparate treatment as
falling between the pregnant and the nonpregnant, rather than between men and women, it is unlikely to find an equal protection violation.”); Johnsen, supra note 88, at 620–22
(“Current doctrine . . . offers women no protection against discrimination that is based
on real biological differences between women and men, and in fact denies that such discrimination is sex-based.”); Levine, supra note 80, at 291–92 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
held that because of the unique nature of pregnancy and the biological differences between men and women, pregnant women and men are not similarly situated.”); Siegel,
Reasoning, supra note 166, at 268–69 (characterizing Geduldig as holding “that pregnancy
classifications are not sex-based”). Congress subsequently abrogated Geduldig by passing
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which includes pregnancy classifications within the definition of gender discrimination for the purposes of Title VII. Pregnancy discrimination is therefore unlawful in the context of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”).
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
See id. (“The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition—pregnancy—from the
list of compensable disabilities.”).
See id.
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men, arguing that the statute upheld the state interest in protecting
teen pregnancy, and only teenage females are capable of becoming
187
The Court also upheld more stringent standards to depregnant.
termine the citizenship status of children born abroad and outside of
marriage to American men than those born abroad and outside of
marriage to American women because “[f]athers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parent188
hood.”
In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Court held
that abortion protesters obstructing access to a clinic were not targeting women as a class, again distinguishing sex-based classification
189
from pregnancy-based classification.
The Supreme Court has also foreclosed the argument that discrimination in the context of reproductive rights violates the equal
protection clause because its impact is to discriminate against women.
The Court has interpreted the equal protection clause to apply only
190
to actions that have discriminatory intent.
State action that disparately impacts women because of their ability to become pregnant is
only considered sex-based discrimination if it can be shown that the
action was taken with the invidious purpose of discriminating against
women as a class; otherwise, it is subject only to rational basis scruti191
ny.
The development of equal protection jurisprudence in a way that
essentially forecloses most equal protection-based challenges in compelled medical treatment cases unduly protects the very type of discrimination the equal protection clause should prohibit. In the context of women it is the ability to bear children that has been the
source of state limitations on their autonomy, whether in the context
of their employment or their right to choose and refuse medical

187
188
189
190
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450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (“Of particular concern to the State is that approximately half of
all teenage pregnancies end in abortion. . . . Only women may become pregnant.”).
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
506 U.S. 263, 267–78 (1993) (“[C]laim that petitioners’ opposition to abortion reflects an
animus against women in general must be rejected.”).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.”); see also Levine, supra note 80, at 291–92 (“[T]he classification in court-ordered
[C]esarean cases is not the result of discriminatory purpose, but rather, discriminatory effect . . . [which], in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish a violation of equal protection.”).
Pregnancy discrimination may be challenged in the context of employment under Title
VII. See supra note 183.
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192

treatment.
It is this very historical discrimination that the Casey
193
court rejected in the context of abortion and that Justice Ginsburg
194
Several scholars
warned that the Carhart decision reinvigorates.
have criticized the chasm between reproductive rights jurisprudence
and equal protection jurisprudence, and have proposed alternative
ways to approach the equal protection doctrine that would account
for the equality implications of infringements on women’s reproduc195
tive rights. For example, Sylvia Law proposes that courts scrutinize
laws to ensure that the law has no significant impact in perpetuating
“the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints
196
on individual freedom.”
If the law has this impact, Law proposes
that it must be “justified as the best means of serving a compelling
197
state purpose.”
Such an approach to equal protection would more fully address
the troubling implications compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women has for women’s equality and would make it more difficult for
courts to compel medical treatment without running afoul of the
equal protection clause. Under Law’s analysis, compelled medical
treatment would be subject to strict scrutiny because it has a significant impact in perpetuating the oppression of women and culturally
192

193

194
195

196

197

See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen, supra note 88, at 623
(“State and social regulations concerning reproductive differences have served to create
and reinforce separate and unequal sex-segregated spheres in the United States.”); Law,
supra note 158, at 1009 (noting “how central state regulation of biology has been to the
subjugation of women, the normal presumption of constitutionality”).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992) (“Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances.”).
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 88, at 622 (“By dismissing claims of sex discrimination on the
grounds that the sexes are differently situated in matters of reproduction, the Court rationalizes differential treatment of the sexes as legitimate and as merely ‘reflecting’ the
fact of biological difference.”); Law, supra note 158, at 955 (attempting “to articulate a
stronger constitutional concept of sex-based equality than that which currently exists”);
Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 166, at 268–71 (criticizing the Court’s decision in Geduldig
and subsequent decisions based on similar reasoning); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE
L.J. 769, 913–15 (2002) (“The simple statement [in Geduldig] that the Court does not
recognize pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination should be sufficient to demonstrate the troubling narrowness of the Court’s definition of sex for the purposes of equal
protection. Closer examination of the sex discrimination jurisprudence, however, reveals
an even more disturbing tension in the Court’s analysis.”).
See Law, supra note 158, at 1008–09; see also Developments in Law—Medical Technology, supra
note 183, at 1582 (“Sylvia Law proposes an alternative approach to equal protection that
would eliminate the presumption of constitutionality attached to laws based on real biological differences.”); Johnsen, supra note 88, at 624 (stating that “[e]qual protection doctrine should incorporate the approach advocated by Professor Sylvia Law”).
See Law, supra note 158, at 1009.
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imposed sex-role constraints on their individual freedom. Treatment
could only be compelled if it were the best means of serving a compelling state interest. Under current abortion jurisprudence, the
state’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling after viability; thus,
treatment could only be compelled if it could be shown that it was the
best means of preserving fetal life after viability.
However, even a more robust equal protection analysis for reproductive rights would be unlikely to provide a complete analysis of the
troubling implications of compelled medical treatment. Analyzing
compelled treatment as an equal protection violation alone cannot
fully realize its infringements on a woman’s liberty just as viewing
compelled treatment only as an infringement on a woman’s liberty
fails to fully realize its implications for women’s equality.
A complete view of the implications of compelled medical treatment requires acknowledgement of its affect on both the liberty and
equality of women. The next subsection discusses how these two interests intertwine to form a hybrid claim based on dignity and how
compelled medical treatment violates the dignity of women.
4. Compelled Treatment and Women’s Dignity
The previous two subsections discussed the liberty and equality
implications of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women and
how approaches that distinguish and separate these two interests fail
to account adequately for the full harm caused by compelled medical
treatment. This subsection argues that an approach that recognizes
the interdependent nature of these two interests can fully recognize
and protect pregnant women’s reproductive rights in general and
their right to avoid compelled treatment in particular.
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women distinguishes
women as a “special class” with limited autonomy, infringing on both
their liberty and equality interests. Compelled medical treatment of
pregnant women implicates women’s liberty by abridging their ability
to control their own bodies; in doing so, it burdens women in ways
men are not burdened and both relies upon and reinforces gender
stereotypes about women’s role as mothers. In this way, liberty and
equality interests are inexorably intertwined in what Laurence Tribe
198
has deemed a “double helix.”
This double helix is, in essence,
about protecting the dignity of autonomous decisionmaking and pro-
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Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare not Speak its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
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tecting individuals from the subordination of dignity in a way that de199
signates them as second-class citizens.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates
the double helix approach and provides insight into the troubling
200
implications of compelled medical treatment. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute that outlawed same-sex sodomy
was unconstitutional, overturning its previous decision in Bowers v.
201
Hardwick.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion cited decisions in which the
Court recognized the right to privacy in personal relationships, advocating for the right of same-sex couples to the same privacy in intimate relationships: “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek
202
autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”
However, the decision did not stop there—it recognized and relied
upon the interrelated nature of liberty and equality: “Equality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both inter203
ests.” Lawrence held that the Texas statute was unconstitutional, not
because there was a specific fundamental right to same-sex sodomy,
but because of the statute’s troubling implications for the rights of
gay individuals. The statute essentially criminalized same-sex sexual
relationships, infringing on the liberty of individuals to choose and
pursue intimate relationships; in doing so, the statute stigmatized
these relationships and all gay individuals, designating them as
204
second-class citizens.
The Court’s analysis in Lawrence allows a more robust approach to
liberty and equality that addresses many of the troubling implications
of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women. First, Lawrence

199
200
201
202
203
204

See Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1703–04 (discussing the Court’s various “dignity” arguments).
539 U.S. 558 (2003). For a deeper discussion of Tribe’s double helix argument and the
Lawrence decision, see generally Tribe, supra note 198.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Lawrence notes:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. . . . The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. . . . [I]t remains a criminal offense
with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.
Id.; see also Tribe, supra note 198, at 1903–07 (“[T]he social and cultural meaning of any
ban on sodomy, gender-neutral or otherwise, particularly given Bowers, is that being gay
or lesbian means being a sodomite, which in turn means being a criminal.”).
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recognizes that it is not necessary to label a specific act at issue as a
fundamental right in order to determine that constitutional principles are violated by the prohibition of that act where the prohibition impacts the right of individuals to make private decisions inhe205
rent to their dignity.
While the right to refuse medical treatment
has only been given status as a “liberty interest” under the constitution, compelled treatment significantly impacts the right of women to
define the borders and contents of deeply personal experiences such
as medical treatment and childbearing. It infringes on these rights
just as the statute at issue in Lawrence infringed on the rights of individuals to define their personal relationships.
Second, the Court’s reasoning implies that a statute need not target a specific class in order to impair that class’s equality. The
Court’s reasoning was not grounded in the Texas statute’s application to same-sex sodomy alone; because of the strong cultural association of sodomy with the gay male, a sodomy statute that applied to all
individuals would still have furthered the stigmatization of gay individuals, and would have been “in and of itself . . . an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in
206
the private spheres.” Thus, under the Court’s reasoning, even a law
that applied to all individuals would be unconstitutional. Compelled
treatment of pregnant women may not explicitly target women, but
its targeting of pregnant individuals infringes on the rights of women
just as surely as sodomy laws infringe on the rights of gay individuals.
The Lawrence decision exemplifies the way in which infringements
on liberty and equality can be inextricably intertwined; the Texas statute infringed on liberty and, in doing so, implicated the equality of
all gay individuals. Similarly, compelled medical treatment of pregnant women implicates the double helix of liberty and equality. It
limits the autonomy of pregnant women and, in doing so, designates
women as a class of persons with limited liberty and thus second-class
citizenship. Indeed, in the context of reproductive rights, Casey

205

206

See Tribe, supra note 198, at 1900–05 (“[T]he Supreme Court went out of its way to recast
the plaintiff’s claim [in Lawrence] to substantive protection under the Due Process Clause
for his private sexual relationships as an asserted ‘fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.’”).
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also Tribe, supra note 198, at 1907–16 (noting that “cultural conflation of sodomy with ‘homosexual’ sodomy, however out of sync with social reality it may be, means that any law banning sodomy, even if it reaches opposite-sex sodomy” will subject homosexual persons to discrimination). This argument is supported by
the Court’s reliance on liberty as opposed to merely equal protection and its overturning
of Bowers, which concerned a statute that criminalized sodomy between all individuals and
not just same-sex sodomy.
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hinted at the need for such an approach in order to adequately address the right of women to make reproductive decisions:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a
child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of
the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her
in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone
be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its
own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been
in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
207
imperatives and her place in society.

In Carhart, the Court moved away from this reasoning, all but ignoring the dignity of women in its decision. In doing so, it embraced
reasoning that may open the door for further curtailment of women’s
reproductive freedom. The troubling implications of this move in
the context of compelled medical treatment demonstrate why a doctrinal approach that acknowledges the full impact of state action on
women’s liberty and equality is vital to uphold their rights as individuals.
B. Public Health Implications
Compelled medical treatment and expanded state power over
women’s reproductive choices also has troubling implications for
public health. While the previous section focuses on constitutional
principles, constitutional concepts of liberty and equality are important both because of their impact on doctrine and because constitu208
tional ideas shape culture. By limiting women’s liberty and equality, cases allowing compelled medical treatment not only directly
impact specific women’s health, but also indirectly impact all women’s health by shaping the culture of reproductive medicine.
Expanding state power to compel the medical treatment of pregnant women will likely result in cases in which neither maternal nor
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Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992); see also Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–52).
See Law, supra note 158, at 956–57 (“[C]onstitutional concepts of equality are important
both because of their concrete impact on legislative power and individual right and because constitutional ideas reflect and shape culture.”).
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fetal health is served. Medicine is inherently imprecise, and medical
technology and knowledge limits physicians’ abilities to accurately
209
predict the outcome of treatment choices. For example, Cesarean
surgeries are often indicated for “fetal distress” as measured by electronic fetal monitoring (EFM). However, the efficacy of EFM is questionable, leading physicians to overestimate risks to the fetus and per210
form unnecessary operations in order to avoid liability.
While
ordinarily patients are free to weigh these predictions themselves,
compelled medical treatment allows the state to weigh the risks for
the pregnant woman and determine how much risk is appropriate for
her to undergo in order to further state interests. Physicians have
sought—and courts have ordered—compelled medical treatment on211
ly to find that their concerns were unwarranted.
Expanding state
justifications for compelled treatment increases the likelihood that
more women will be compelled to undergo treatment that serves neither their health nor the health of the child they carry.
Compelled medical treatment also creates confusing and ethically
troubling obligations for physicians. In the shadow of Carhart’s language on women’s regret, health care providers may conclude that,
as a matter of law, pregnant women are less capable of making autonomous medical decisions, particularly where those decisions may
lead to results women might later regret. Hospitals and physicians
may fear that, if the mother is not legally capable of exercising informed consent, they will find themselves liable should she later regret her decision. The implication that treatment may now be compelled where there is uncertainty about the consequences for the
mother’s health increases the circumstances in which physicians and
hospitals may feel the need to seek court intervention to avoid potential liability. Where physicians are uncertain about whether a medical
treatment is necessary for fetal health, they may err on the side of fetal health, rather than maternal health, and seek court intervention to
212
avoid future liability.
Coercive care also damages the doctor-patient relationship and
213
discourages women from seeking prenatal care. This is particularly
209
210
211
212

213

See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text.
See Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice that Should be Supported, 32 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 360–62 (2008) (discussing problems with the use of EFM).
See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
See Gallagher, supra note 76, at 50–53 (“One of the pressures for court-ordered Caesareans [sic], and probably for the increased number of Caesarean [sic] sections overall,
arises from physicians’ anxiety about potential malpractice liability.”).
See Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee Opinion 321: Maternal Decision
Making, Ethics, and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127, 1134 (2005) (“Coercive
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troubling in the context of women with high risk pregnancies, who
are most in need of prenatal care but will be more likely to avoid it if
their high-risk status will encourage physicians to compel treatment.
For these reasons, medical organizations caution that compelling
medical treatment of pregnant women raises serious ethical concerns
for physicians and may damage physicians’ ability to provide prenatal
214
care.
For those who do seek medical care, the prospect of compelled
treatment creates an adversarial relationship between patient and
215
physician. It undermines the trust that allows women to communi216
If physicians are able to compel treatcate with their physicians.

214

215

216

and punitive policies are potentially counterproductive in that they are likely to discourage prenatal care and successful treatment, adversely affect infant mortality rates, and
undermine the physician-patient relationship.”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at §
19-2 (“[J]udicial balancing of the interests of pregnant women and their fetuses, and the
consequent possibility of judicial intervention to require pregnant women to undergo
medical treatment against their will, adversely affects the doctor-patient relationship and
may discourage some pregnant women from seeking the health care they need.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 53–54 (“Judicial decisions authorizing forced Caesareans [sic]
threaten to distort the medical care of all birthing women . . . [and] introduce an implicit
threat of coercion into doctor-patient relationships.”).
The American Medical Association (AMA), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),
the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the American Public
Health Association (APHA) all discourage physicians from seeking court intervention
and state that pregnant women’s medical treatment decisions should be respected. See
FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, § 19-2 (discussing arguments for and against judicial intervention to protect the interests of the fetus); H.M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by
Pregnant Women, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2663-66 (1990) (“The physician’s duty is to
ensure that the pregnant woman makes an informed and thoughtful decision, not to indicate the woman’s decision. Physicians [s]hould [n]ot [h]ave a [l]egal [d]uty to [s]eek
[c]ourt-[o]rdered [o]bstetrical [i]nterventions.”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 213, at 1061 (stating that maternal decisions must be respected, criticizing coercive and punitive measures, and stating that judicial intervention should not
be employed absent “extraordinary circumstances, circumstances that, in fact, the Committee on Ethics cannot currently imagine”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Fetal Therapy—Ethical Considerations, 103 PEDIATRICS 1061, 1061–62 (1999) (stating
that physicians should respect maternal choice and assessment of risk and that, under limited circumstances when fetal therapy would prevent irrevocable and substantial fetal
harm with negligible risk to the health and well-being of the pregnant woman, physicians
should engage in a process of communication and conflict resolution that may require
consultation with an ethics committee; judicial review is only to be employed in “rare cases”); see also Harris, supra note 72, at 140–42 (outlining the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists position on maternal versus fetal rights).
See MERRICK, supra note 100, at 73 (“Court-ordered intervention may . . . create adversarial relations between the woman and the fetus—and subsequently the born child—if [the
woman] feels her own health are welfare are being sacrificed.”).
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at § 19-2 (“[J]udicial intervention to require pregnant
women to undergo medical treatment against their will . . . may discourage some pregnant women from seeking the health care they need.”); Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra
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ment of pregnant women at the expense of their health, pregnant
women may be less likely to discuss symptoms of conditions they fear
will result in a court order. Physicians, in turn, may be less likely to
explain medical options and obtain informed consent if they can
threaten with court orders those patients they believe to be irrational
217
These
or unlikely to agree with their recommended treatment.
consequences have particularly troubling implications for low-income
and minority patients. Low-income women have more difficulty finding a physician, much less the flexibility to choose a physician that
218
will respect their decisions and birthing plans. A 1987 New England
Journal of Medicine survey of compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women found that 81% of women subject to orders were minorities,
219
and 24% did not speak English as their primary language.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Carhart decision gives new life to an outdated view of pregnant women as second-class citizens. Like Judge Branford’s opinion
in In re A.C., the Carhart majority designates pregnant women as a
unique category of persons with limited autonomy. It implies that
women not only have diminished rights to exercise informed consent, but also that, in the context of medical decisions that could detrimentally impact the child they carry, pregnant women have diminished capacity to exercise informed consent.
The decision
concludes that the state, armed with the dubious interests of expressing respect for fetal life and protecting women from making medical
decisions they might regret, may ban a procedure that may be a
woman’s safest option where questionable evidence creates any degree of uncertainty about women’s medical needs.
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note 101, at 45 (arguing that forced Cesarean sections “encourage[] an adversarial relationship between the obstetrician and the patient”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, supra note 213, at 1134 (“Various studies have suggested that attempts to criminalize pregnant women’s behavior discourage women from seeking prenatal care.”).
See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 45 (“[The ability to seek court-ordered operations] gives the obstetrician a weapon to bully women he views as irrational into submission.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 52 (“Courts should make clear that doctors and
hospitals will not be under a duty to disregard a competent woman’s rights by overriding
her informed refusal of a Caesarean [sic] section or other invasive medical treatment.”).
See Barbara M. Aved et al., Barriers to Prenatal Care for Low-Income Women, 158 WEST. J. MED.
493 (1993) (discussing obstacles low-income women face in finding a physician for prenatal care and birth, and the fragile relationship between low-income women and the
medical community).
See Kolder et al., supra note 85, at 1193.
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While this Article focuses on the majority opinion’s implications
for compelled medical treatment, the majority opinion’s expansion
of state interest and erosion of the primacy of women’s health has
implications far beyond compelled treatment and abortion. During
the course of pregnancy, nearly every action a woman takes is likely to
have some impact on the fetus because of the fetus’s dependence on
the pregnant woman’s body. Few of these decisions will create a risk
of fetal death such that the state’s interest in fetal life recognized in
Roe is implicated. However, Carhart expands the state interest in fetal
life and reinterprets the state interest in maternal health to implicate
nearly any decision a pregnant woman may make. Pregnant women
may also wish to undertake medical treatment that poses additional
risks to the fetus, such as elective surgery or medications for pain
management or psychological illness. Under Carhart, the state may
justify intervention in these decisions based on newly recognized interest in promoting respect for human life and preventing pregnant
women from making medical decisions they may regret due to their
unique relationship with the child they carry. State intervention need
not be limited to medical treatment. These newly recognized state
interests are also potentially implicated when an obese pregnant
woman eats fattening foods, when a woman with a misaligned placenta engages in sexual intercourse, or when a pregnant woman decides
to forgo prenatal vitamins. Pregnancy is unique in many ways, both
as a medical condition and as a life experience. The exceptional experience of women, however, does not justify their designation as a
separate class of individuals deprived of basic rights to bodily autonomy and informed consent. Rather than commandeering the bodies
of pregnant women, the most effective way to ensure healthy pregnancies and births is to ensure that every medical decision a pregnant
woman makes is fully informed, uncoerced, and supported by her
ability to access quality medical care and effect her choice in the safest way possible.

